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ABSTRACT 
This research explores the capability requirements for the employment of a Marine Rifle 
Company organized to conduct Enhanced Company Operations (ECO).  It uses a 
simulation model, built in an agent-based simulation tool called MANA, to evaluate the 
logistical impact of ECO on a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).  ECO involves 
reorganizing and augmenting the traditional rifle company in a manner that contributes to 
“enhanced” command and control, intelligence, logistics, and fires capabilities.  The end 
state is to develop the company’s ability to become the base maneuver element of the 
Marine Air Ground Task Force, a role traditionally held by the infantry battalion.  This 
research used a robust design of experiments method called the Nearly Orthogonal Latin 
Hypercube to vary a set of design factors in an efficient manner, culminating in over 
5,460 simulated missions.  Statistical results indicate that it is possible to support an 
enhanced company with current MEU assets, and that resupply responsiveness is more 
important than the unit’s distance to the seabase.  This research also confirms the validity 
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THESIS DISCLAIMER 
The reader is cautioned that the computer programs presented in this research may 
not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been made, within 
the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logical 
errors, they cannot be considered validated. Any application of these programs without 
additional verification is at the risk of the user. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The modern irregular warfare environment has dramatically impacted the battle space 
assignments and mission scope of tactical units that now take on much more 
responsibility than traditionally called for.  The purpose of this research is to gain insights 
into the required capabilities, tactics, and the associated support effort of the enhanced 
company operating on the noncontiguous battlefield.  It identifies some of the risks and 
planning considerations that a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) commander might 
consider in the decision-making process. 
This research utilizes an agent-based simulation tool, Map-Aware Non-uniform 
Automata (MANA), developed by the New Zealand Defence Forces, to evaluate the 
logistical impact that Marine Corps Enhanced Company Operations (ECO) could have on 
a MEU.  This summary gives a broad overview of ECO, describes an approved modeling 
scenario, the research methodology, and the analytical results.  This research is intended 
to assist the development of ECO concepts, techniques, tactics, and procedures as this 
cutting-edge doctrine develops and matures.  Specifically, this thesis addresses the 
following questions: 
• Given the current organizational structure of a MEU, what is the logistical 
impact of supporting an enhanced company with the MEU’s  
supporting assets? 
• What are the critical logistical factors relating to mission success during 
ECO within the context of a given scenario? 
• What are the critical logistical capabilities of the MEU that will enable it 
to provide continuous sustainment to an enhanced company? 
• What is the logistical impact of increasing the distance of the supported 
unit from the seabase? 
These questions guided this research in the application of modern simulation, modeling 
techniques, and data analysis to focus on the logistical requirements of an enhanced 
company. 
 xx
The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) is currently exploring the 
viability of ECO.  This research is in direct support of their effort to enhance the fighting 
capability and reach of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). 
ECO requires reorganizing and augmenting the traditional rifle company in a 
manner that contributes to “enhanced” command and control, intelligence, logistics, and 
fires capabilities.  This process not only involves personnel changes, but also specific 
training and technological improvements.  The end state is to develop the company’s 
ability to become the base maneuver element of the MAGTF, a role traditionally held by 
the infantry battalion. 
This research is centered on a realistic Africa-based scenario, provided by 
MCWL, which allows enemy agents to influence the logistical demand of the supported 
company.  A distillation of this scenario, incorporated into MANA, models the 
interactions between the Marine enhanced company and insurgent forces in the simulated 
ECO environment.  These interactions provide insights into the effectiveness of the 
MEU’s resupply capability. 
Design of experiment (DOE) principles guided the execution of two simulation-
based experiments, which ensured a comprehensive exploration of the problem space and 
efficient use of simulation resources.  A robust DOE method, called the Nearly 
Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH), is incorporated to achieve a comprehensive 
statistical analysis.  This research also uses an analytical technique, known as  
Data Farming, which entails running a model many times while systematically changing 
input parameters according to the DOE.  The data sets resulting from these experiments 
are then explored statistically to see what patterns and other behaviors emerge. 
The NOLH design determined how the design factors were varied over 5,460 
simulation runs, resulting in analyzable data capable of providing valuable insight into 
the questions above.  The analytical results of this exploration will help focus planners at 
MCWL on key parameters as they design future ECO experiments and develop ECO 
doctrinal concepts.  Specific findings, based on the assumptions of this scenario and the 
analyzed output, include: 
 
 xxi
• It is possible to support an enhanced company with current MEU assets. 
• The number of sorties required to support an enhanced company over a 
two-week period remained relatively stable. 
• For maximum effectiveness, allocation of one aircraft per platoon position 
is required. 
• Distance from the company position to the seabase matters, but not as 
much as response time to rapid requests.  Logistical planners should work 
to minimize response time by taking steps such as building prepackaged 
supply bundles in anticipation of requests. 
• In a rapid request scenario, an MV-22’s speed significantly increases the 
MEU’s responsiveness over using CH-53s. 
• If all other parameters are equal, using MV-22s enable a seabase to be 
further away from the supported unit than using CH-53s. 
• The combat intensity increases the demand on the MEU’s assets, so 
reserve capacity is essential. 
• This research validates the MV-22’s contribution to the viability of the 
seabase concept. 
The MANA model developed for this research can be adapted to explore many 
other questions.  For example, it could be used to evaluate a scheduled resupply model, 
which could reveal that the CH-53’s cargo capacity advantages trump the VM-22’s speed 
advantage under that circumstance.  This model could also be adapted to explore other 
aircraft options, like cargo unmanned aerial systems or C-130 air delivery capabilities. 
 xxii
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Battles are won by slaughter and manoeuver.  The greater the general, the 
more he contributes in manoeuver, the less he demands in slaughter. 
—Winston Churchill (Headquarters, USMC, 1997, p. 21) 
A. OVERVIEW 
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) uses maneuver warfare as a basic 
doctrinal concept to fight its battles.  Maneuver warfare demands the ability to avoid the 
enemy’s strengths and attack his weaknesses in ways that are advantageous to the overall 
strategy.  This overarching concept has heavily influenced the development of the Marine 
Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)—size-scalable, combined-arms, multi-mission-
capable force used across the spectrum of conflict.  The Marine Corps is continually 
developing tactics, techniques, procedures, and technologies that seek to increase the 
efficiency and lethality of the MAGTF.  In this spirit, the Marine Corps Warfighting 
Laboratory (MCWL), whose “purpose is to improve current and future naval 
expeditionary warfare capabilities” (Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory homepage, 
2010), is currently exploring the viability of a concept called Enhanced Company 
Operations (ECO).  This research explores and describes the development of ECO, and 
analyzes the logistical supportability of an enhanced company operating in an austere and 
hostile environment, using simulation and modeling techniques. 
B. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
In September 2005, Matthew D. Bain, then a Marine Corps Captain, completed a 
thesis entitled “Supporting a Marine Corps Distributed Operations Platoon:  A 
Quantitative Analysis.”  His thesis used simulation modeling and statistical analysis to 
evaluate the logistical supportability of the distributed operations (DO) concept.  DO 
involved spreading specialized, platoon-sized infantry units across a battlefield in a much 
more dispersed manner than traditional doctrine allowed.  Captain Bain found that the  
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concept was logistically supportable, but it used a large proportion of the supporting 
unit’s aircraft assets, thus substantially limiting the commander’s ability to support  
other priorities. 
MCWL conducted a number of experiments from 2004 to 2006 to test DO 
concepts.  In an article in the April 2008 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette,  
Colonel Vincent J. Goulding, Jr., USMC (Ret.), the director of MCWL’s Experiments 
Division, summarized the contribution that DO had made to training, manning, and 
equipping the Marine infantry platoon (Goulding, 2008b).  In 2008, the DO concept 
evolved to company-sized operations supported by increased intelligence and command 
and control (C2) capabilities.  This evolved concept is called ECO and comes, in part, as a 
result of current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In August 2008, the Commandant of 
the Marine Corps, General James Conway, signed a white paper entitled, “A Concept for 
Enhanced Company Operations,” which states: 
Enhanced Company Operations describes an approach to the operational 
art that maximizes the tactical flexibility offered by true decentralized 
mission accomplishment, consistent with commander’s intent and 
facilitated by improved command and control, intelligence, logistics, and 
fires capabilities.  Enhanced Company Operations will be reliant on 
increased access to, and organic control of, functional support, as well as 
excellence at the individual, squad, and platoon levels.  As such, it builds 
on the results of Distributed Operations experimentation and capability 
development to provide battalion commanders the critical link between 
operational planning and squad level tactical execution (Conway, 2008, 
pp. 57-58). 
ECO will involve a number of structural, manning, and equipment changes to the 
Marine Corps’ traditional rifle company, as well as changes to how the company is 
deployed and supported; however, these changes are still evolving.  In fact, the 
Commandant’s paper addresses the probable need to enhance the MAGTF in support of 
the enhanced company.  For example, it may be necessary to incorporate cargo 
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) into the MAGTF to facilitate logistical support to the 
deployed companies.  Not surprisingly, this concept has been entitled Enhanced MAGTF 
Operations (EMO).  In the August 2009 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette,  
Colonel Goulding authored an article on EMO that states: 
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EMO is an approach to expeditionary operations that maximizes the 
flexibility offered by highly capable tactical formations that are 
commanded and controlled, supported, and sustained by a unitary 
command element equally capable of providing organic support as it is of 
leveraging joint and coalition partners.  EMO builds on ECO to ensure 
that improvements at the tactical level are matched by those at the 
operational level and shared across the MAGTF (Goulding, 2009, p. 14). 
As shown, these evolving topics comprise today’s cutting edge efforts at improving the 
MAGTF.  This effort will assist that improvement. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research will analyze the logistical supportability of an enhanced company 
operating in an austere and hostile environment, using methods and analysis similar to 
what Captain Bain used to evaluate the DO platoon.  Specifically, this research addresses 
the following questions: 
• Given the current organizational structure of a Marine Expeditionary Unit 
(MEU), what is the logistical impact of supporting an enhanced company 
with the MEU’s supporting assets? 
• What are the critical logistical factors relating to mission success during 
ECO within the context of a given scenario? 
• What are the critical logistical capabilities of the MEU that will enable it 
to provide continuous sustainment to an enhanced company? 
• What is the logistical impact of increasing the distance of the supported 
unit from the seabase? 
These questions will guide the use of modern simulation, modeling techniques, and data 
analysis to focus on the logistical requirements of an enhanced company. 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
 This research will inform MCWL’s ECO Limited Objective Experiment in the 
summer of 2010, and further logistics-specific experiments in 2011.  It will also influence 
future experimental objectives, funding, and the development of tactics, techniques, and 
procedures relating to ECO and EMO.  The model and associated data developed for this 
 4
research is available to facilitate related quick-turn studies.  Another quote from the 
Commandant’s white paper reinforces the need for this analysis: 
Logistics has the potential to be the Achilles’ heel of the company’s ability 
to conduct the types of expeditionary and irregular warfare our 
warfighting concepts envision.  Traditional and time-honored approaches 
need to be reviewed in the context of distributed operations in austere 
environments.  Fast moving or dismounted tactical units will need to be 
secure in the knowledge that tailored re-supply will occur when they need 
it, with only what they need, exactly where they need it (Conway, 2008,  
p. 60). 
E. METHODOLOGY 
To explore this problem, this research uses a specific scenario to set up the initial 
battlefield parameters.  An agent-based simulation tool developed by the New Zealand 
defense forces, called Map-Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA), will use these 
factors to model the interactions between blue (friendly) and red (enemy) forces in a 
simulated ECO environment.  Design of experiment (DOE) principles will guide 
execution of the simulation-based experiments, which ensures a comprehensive 
exploration of the problem space and efficient use of simulation resources.  The DOE 
will dictate how analysis factors are varied over multiple simulation runs, resulting in 
analyzable data capable of providing valuable insight into the research questions.  The 
analytical results of this exploration will help focus planners at MCWL on key 
parameters as they design future ECO experiments and develop ECO doctrinal concepts. 
The remainder of this research will flow as follows.  Chapter II describes ECO in 
more detail and outlines the modeling scenario.  Chapter III describes the MANA model, 
explains the simulation parameters, the DOE, and measures of effectiveness (MOEs).  




II. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Conventional wisdom tells us that the battalion is the smallest tactical 
formation capable of sustained independent operations; current operations 
tell us it is the company. 
—General James T. Conway, USMC (Conway, 2008) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the background and development of ECO.  It also outlines 
an enhanced company’s organizational structure, equipment, and capabilities.  Section D 
of this chapter describes the modeling scenario and modeling tools that this research uses. 
Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States has been engaged in 
what has been termed “The Long War.”  This title reflects the reality of an 
intergenerational struggle against extremist ideas, and those who choose to back them 
with force and violence.  Future battles in The Long War will be defined by confronting 
asymmetrical threats and nonstate actors.  These changes from traditional conflicts 
between state actors have forced the Marine Corps to develop new doctrinal strategies to 
confront the new reality.  For example, Fleet Marine Force Manual 6-4 (1978), the 
Marine Corps’ doctrinal publication for rifle company/platoon operations, states that a 
rifle company’s defensive battle area should be 1,100 meters deep with a frontage of 
1,500 meters, in ideal terrain conditions.  In current operations, rifle companies are 
responsible for areas many times that size (V. J. Goulding, personal communication, 
March 11, 2010).  Tactics and technology have progressed to the point that modern 
operations are much more dispersed, and C2 is much more decentralized.  The Marine 
Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 (2008) document states, “For the Corps, we must 
continue to prepare for the challenges that loom on the horizon.  We are by law, and will 
continue to be, the Nation’s force in readiness—‘most ready when the Nation is least 
ready’” (p. 13).  Chapter 5 of that document outlines the implications to the Marine 
Corps’ force structure as it moves further into the twenty-first century.  As a direct result 
of these and other realities, ECO has emerged as a stepping stone to that future state. 
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B. WHAT ARE ENHANCED COMPANY OPERATIONS (ECO)? 
1. Overview 
ECO involves reorganizing and augmenting the traditional rifle company in a 
manner that contributes to “enhanced” C2, intelligence, logistics, and fires capabilities.  
This process not only involves personnel changes, but also specific training and 
technological improvements.  The end state is an improved ability for the company to 
become the base maneuver element of the MAGTF, a role traditionally held by the 
infantry battalion.  Changes include the incorporation of a company-level operations 
center (CLOC), a company-level intelligence capability, enhanced fire support 
coordination, and personnel specifically tasked to focus on logistics (Goulding, 2009a).  
To date, the personnel changes have not required additional numbers, but only a change 
to military occupational specialty (MOS) mixes and structuring within the company.  
These changes provide the company commander with the means to effectively coordinate 
the battlefield functions throughout his area of operations (AO).  Specific changes are 
discussed in Section B.3. 
2. Concept Development 
The first considered enhancement to the standard rifle company was the 
company-level intelligence cell (CLIC).  During the I Marine Expeditionary Force’s 
Irregular Warfare Conference in June 2007, the conference working groups identified a 
company-level intelligence capability as an emerging requirement.  Because maneuver 
warfare is dependent on intelligence-driven operations, company commanders in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were already creating this capability from within their 
existing personnel structure.  The MCWL conference participants used the CLIC concept 
as an opportunity to shift from the platoon-focused DO program to the current company-
focused effort.  Colonel Goulding stated, “For all intents and purposes, enhanced 
company operations, or ECO, was born” (Goulding, 2008b, p. 18).  MCWL conducted 
two limited objective experiments (LOEs), identified simply as LOEs 1 and 2, to begin 
exploring the CLIC concept soon after the conference (Goulding, 2008b). 
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As the LOEs for the CLIC progressed, and current operations in OIF and 
Afghanistan were studied, MCWL and the other organizations involved decided to 
expand the CLIC into a CLOC.  The demands of current battlefields require that more 
battlefield functions, like fire support coordination and logistics, be pushed to the 
company level.  The CLOC became the “centerpiece” of LOE 2.  The LOE process 
included a research phase to define required tasks, development of a prototype “best 
practices” model, manning and equipping that model, conducting the required training, 
and then running the test unit through exercise MOJAVE VIPER, conducted at 
Twentynine Palms, California during the summer of 2009 (Goulding, 2008b).  Other 
experiments conducted include LOE 3, which looked at unmanned air and ground 
vehicles to support distributed logistics and casualty handling.  The CLOC concept also 
evolved to the CLOC (light).  At its essence, this means that everything a CLOC needs 
must be transportable by the MV-22 Osprey (Goulding, 2009b).  During the CLOC 
(light) LOE, a prototypical communications suite was used to exercise C2.  Additionally, 
the 10th Marines conducted a distributed artillery experiment at  
Fort Sill, Oklahoma using the M777 howitzer (Goulding, 2009b). 
As the ECO organizational capability requirements continue to define themselves, 
so too do the mission requirements.  The first MCWL LOEs considered forward-
operating-base-centered experiments because the units conducting them did so as part of 
their predeployment training for current operations.  The next experiment, however, will 
get back to more traditional Marine Corps expeditionary concepts.  In concert with the 
seabasing and ship-to-objective maneuver concepts, LOE 4, to be held in July 2010, will 
test the company landing team (CoLT).  A traditional battalion landing team is centered 
around an infantry battalion, reinforced with other MAGTF elements, depending on 
mission requirements.  The CoLT is a scaled down, but similarly task-organized unit 
(Goulding, 2009b).  This concept will give the MAGTF the higher degree of flexibility 
demanded by today’s operational environment.  Understandably, the CoLT will require 
table of organization (T/O) changes, which are discussed in the next section.  LOE 4 will 
exercise the CoLT. 
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When taken together, the CLIC, the CLOC, and the CoLT form the core of the 
ECO concept as it currently stands.  Pushing these capabilities to the company level is a 
tremendous paradigm shift from traditional operations, yet has great potential to increase 
the lethality of the MAGTF.  As the concepts change, so must the organization and 
equipment if these concepts are going to be realized. 
3. Organization 
The current Marine Corps rifle company T/O 1013G requires 182 Marines and 
includes a headquarters section, three rifle platoons, and a weapons platoon, which 




Figure 1.   Current Marine Corps Rifle Company Table of Organization 1013G (From:  
Infantry Officer’s Advisory Group Enhanced Company Operations Update 
PowerPoint Brief, 2009). 
 9
The major changes to the experimental enhanced company T/O X4.4 include 
doubling the headquarters section with Marines to run the CLOC, reducing the number of 
Marines in each rifle platoon from 43 to 42, moving the assault section Marines into the 
rifle platoons, and including an 11-Marine scout section (with joint fires observer) in the 
weapons platoon.  These structural changes keep the number of Marines at 182 (see 
Figures 2 and 3) (Goulding, 2009b). 
 
 
Figure 2.   Experimental Marine Corps Enhanced Rifle Company Table of Organization 
Model X-4.4 (From:  Infantry Officer’s Advisory Group Enhanced Company 
Operations Update PowerPoint Brief, 2009). 
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Figure 3.   Experimental Marine Corps Enhanced Rifle Company Headquarters Section 
and Standard Augments (From:  Infantry Officer’s Advisory Group Enhanced 
Company Operations Update, 2009). 
4. Equipment 
The initial equipment baseline for the enhanced table of equipment (T/E) is the 
same as the traditional T/E.  As experimentation continues, technology evolves, 
requirements are identified, and systems are acquired, the T/E will change to support the 
mission requirements.  For example, to support C2 functions, an over-the-horizon/on-the-
move tactical radio is necessary, but a specific system has not yet been identified to fulfill 
this requirement, although there are candidates.  In addition to the radio, when one 
considers the range of ECO capabilities that need to be supported, the equipment 
requirements are quite large and may include: 
• Data systems 
• Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) sensors 
• UASs 
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• Unmanned Ground Vehicles 
• Targeting devices 
• Improved company-level organic fires capability 
• Water production 
• Power production 
All of these considerations need to be taken under the context that there are firm 
weight and space constraints.  For, as S. L. A. Marshall wrote in The Soldier’s Load and 
the Mobility of a Nation (2004), “No logistical system is sound unless its first principle is 
enlightened conservation of the power of the individual fighter” (p. iii).  This thesis 
considers current and near future equipment sets in order to keep the simulations close to 
what is presently realistic. 
5. Additional Capabilities 
Other changes will need to be made in addition to manpower and equipment 
changes.  Perhaps first among these is training.  The current pipeline that produces 
infantry company commanders and their staff does not adequately prepare them for 
enhanced operations.  Additionally, the training that produces infantryman will need to be 
examined if ECO is to become a reality.  There are advances in training simulation 
technologies that will perhaps complement formal schooling and live training.  These 
technologies should be leveraged if ECO is to become reality.  It has also become evident 
that the MAGTF support structure will need enhancements to support ECO (Goulding, 
2009a).  The demands on the MAGTF’s C2, communications, fires, and logistics will all 
increase to support ECO, especially in a ship-to-objective maneuver context. 
C. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
1. Overview 
This study uses a scenario developed by MCWL and used during the ECO Fires 
Conference of April 21-23, 2009, which provides a realistic operational environment in 
which to test the ECO concept.  The fictional scenario takes place on the African 
continent in the border area between Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
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In the notional orders describing the scenario, MCWL changed the names of the countries 
to prevent others from mistaking them for real-world orders.  Additionally, the border 
between Burundi and Tanzania is notionally considered coastline.  In other words, 
Tanzania is covered by the Indian Ocean, as shown in Figure 4.  From this point forward, 
Burundi is referred to as Bunduri, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo is referred 
to as Razie, to prevent any association with real-world events. 
 
Figure 4.   The ECO scenario area is shown in green (From:  MCWL ECO Fires 
Conference PowerPoint Brief, 2009). 
2. General Situation 
The United States has a supportive relationship with the government of Bunduri, a 
relatively stable democracy in East Africa.  The United States has a neutral relationship 
with the government of Razie, which is led by a corrupt president who has used various 
nefarious means to stay in power for many years.  Within Razie, there is a government 
opposition movement called the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).  In the latest 
elections, the leader of the MDC won the popular vote, but the sitting president refused to 
recognize the election results.  As a result of internal and international pressures, the two 
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parties reached a power-sharing agreement with the president remaining in place and the 
winner of the elections serving as prime minister.  After a failed assassination attempt on 
the prime minister, in which the president’s followers were implicated, the president 
dissolved the national government and instituted martial law.  The prime minister fled to 
the east of Razie with his MDC followers.  The MDC’s military arm, the Manicaland 
Peoples Force (MPF), rebelled and took control over Manica Province in Eastern Razie.  
The former prime minister announced the formation of the independent state of 
Manicaland and declared war against Razie.  Additionally, he declared Manica tribal 
lands within Bunduri as a part of Manicaland, and the MPF crossed into western Bunduri. 
After the incursion into Bunduri, small bands of MPF killed a number of Bunduri 
police and government officials.  Relying on tribal affiliations, the MPF appealed to the 
Bunduri populace for support.  Civil unrest erupted, the president of Bunduri declared 
martial law, and the Bunduri Armed Forces (BAF) mobilized to restore order.  A BAF 
battalion deployed to take on the MPF, but the disorganized, poorly-led battalion was 
beaten.  The president of Bunduri, fearing the collapse of his government and his inability 
to stop the MPF, appealed to the U.S. for military intervention. 
In response to the appeal for help, the United States established Joint Task Force 
East Africa and deployed the 15th MEU to the area.  The 15th MEU was assigned the AO 
denoted in Figure 5.  The Joint Task Force mission is to contain the international 
incursions by the Razie MDC in order to ensure stability of the East African 
subcontinent.  The 15th MEU’s mission is to clear the MPF militia forces in zone and 
restore the international border with Razie, in order to support the BAF’s stabilization 
efforts.  The MEU commander’s concept of operations breaks up the MEU mission into 
three phases: 
• Phase 1:  Ship-to-Objective Maneuver.  Deploy forces into Manicaland 
in western Bunduri in order to seize population centers and clear these  
of MPF. 
• Phase 2:  Clearance Operations.  15th MEU forces initially concentrate 
on denying movement to MFP militia through ISR and ground/air 
interdiction operations.  Once MPF maneuver is limited, 15th MEU will 
extend ISR to outlying areas and conduct limited offensive operations 
against remaining MPF concentrations.  This phase ends when MPF 
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militia forces operating within the 15th MEU AO no longer pose a threat to 
the local population, the international border is restored, the ground 
combat element is prepared to transition security responsibilities to 
government of Bunduri forces, and the MEU is postured to transition to 
support and security operations. 
• Phase 3:  Transition to Support.  Stability and Reconstruction 
Operations – This phase commences with the initial transition of 
control/security in the AO to the government of Bunduri. 
 
Figure 5.   The 15th MEU area of operations is denoted by the red box (From:  MCWL 
ECO Fires Conference PowerPoint Brief, 2009). 
The ground combat element in this scenario is Battalion Landing Team 1st 
Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (BLT 1/1), which contains three enhanced companies.  
The BLT commander divided his AO into company-level areas of responsibility (AORs) 
and assigned them tasks aligned with the MEU commander’s phases listed above. 
This thesis considers Alpha Company, one of the enhanced companies, and also 
the main effort through Phase 2.  The scenario begins towards the end of Phase 2.  The 
MPF forces have been driven from Alpha Company’s AOR, but they continue to make 
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incursions across the border to influence the local populace and to harass friendly forces.  
For the purpose of keeping the simulation modeling within a realistic scope, only  
Alpha Company is modeled, and, since they are the main effort, they have the luxury of 




Figure 6.   BLT 1/1 AO divided into company-level AORs (From:  MCWL ECO Fires 
Conference PowerPoint Brief, 2009). 
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3. Special Situation 
a. Enemy 
Higher headquarters estimates the 3,000-4,000-strong MPF to be armed 
with substantial small arms supplied by defecting Razie National Army forces.  These 
arms include rocket-propelled grenades, 7.62mm and 12.7mm machine guns, and 81mm 
mortars.  The MPF is capable of placing mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).  
They may have a limited number of SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, but they have not yet 
demonstrated this capability.  They are typically foot-mobile forces, but they also have 
commercial 4×4 vehicles that can be fitted with medium or heavy machine guns.  While 
little is known about their organizational structure, the MPF is loosely organized at the 
small-unit level into squads, platoons, and possibly companies.  It is unlikely that they are 
effectively organized beyond the company level.  At the height of the incursion, it is 
estimated that there were 1,000 MPF forces in Bunduri.  They employ effective, 
decentralized guerrilla tactics in tactical units from as small as 4–6 personnel to as large 
as 12–15 personnel.  Forces in excess of 15 personnel have been rare in Bunduri.  The 
MPF was able to effectively coordinate a series of up to 50 small units to defeat the BAF 
battalion discussed previously.  The MPF has proven to be committed and ruthless in 
combat.  There are no longer established MPF positions in the Alpha Company AO.  All 
MPF incursions are thought to originate from across the border in Razie.  Although the 
MPF has left the Alpha Company AO, they are still attempting to influence the local 
populace by making cross-border incursions and harassing the U.S. forces in the area. 
b. Friendly 
Alpha Company is an ECO-capable unit that has been operating in the 
southern part of BLT 1/1’s AO for six weeks.  They have cleared the enemy forces in 
their zone and are preparing to transition to stability operations.  Despite the combat 
operations, their losses have been minimal and they have received replacements from the 




personnel from the battalion that even non-enhanced companies receive.  Since they are 
the ground combat element main effort, they enjoy the priority of support from the  
15th MEU. 
4. Mission 
The mission of Alpha Company is to clear the MPF from within their assigned 
AO in order to set conditions to conduct support, stability, and reconstruction operations. 
5. Execution 
Alpha Company will establish three platoon positions within the AOR, which are 
shown in Figure 7.  From these positions, they will conduct patrols and checkpoints to 
monitor enemy activity and engage any MPF forces that move into the area.  Platoon 
positions will be mutually supportive where possible, and will cover their assigned 
sectors with observation and fires. 
 
Figure 7.   Alpha Company AOR.  The white lines and Route 5 road roughly outline the 
AOR, approximately 344 square miles.  The company headquarters is co-located 
with 2nd platoon. 
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6. Administration and Logistics 
The 15th MEU aviation assets will resupply the company.  Delivery will be in the 
vicinity of the platoon positions and/or other precoordinated locations.  The battalion and 
MEU supporting assets are located at the forward arming and refueling point (FARP), 70 
kilometers to the east-southeast of the company headquarters.  Casualty evacuations will 
be by helicopter. 
7. Command and Signal 
The 15th MEU headquarters is located on a ship off the coast of Bunduri.  The 
battalion headquarters is located at the FARP.  While the other companies are technically 
a part of the scenario, they will not be modeled in the simulation.  Alpha Company will 
maintain a common operational picture at the CLOC.  Fire support requests, logistics 
requests, and casualty evacuation requests will all be to the battalion headquarters via 
radio networks.  Intracompany communications will also be via radio networks. 
D. THE MAP AWARE NON-UNIFORM AUTOMATA (MANA) COMBAT 
SIMULATION TOOL 
The remainder of this chapter will describe the MANA modeling environment 
and how this research implements the scenario into MANA.  Readers interested in more 
information than is provided hereafter should consult the MANA version 4 User’s Manual 
and the MANA-V Supplementary Manual, both available through the Simulation 
Experiments and Efficient Designs (SEED) Center at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS). 
1. What is MANA? 
MANA is an agent-based distillation model developed at New Zealand’s Defence 
Technology Agency, beginning in 2000.  The developers, inspired by the MCWL Project 
Albert agent-based models (ABMs) ISAAC and EINSTein, began work on MANA after 
it became apparent that purely physics-based models could not adequately analyze the 
intangible aspects of combat, such as C2 and situational awareness (SA) (McIntosh, 
Galligan, Anderson, & Lauren, 2007).  In MANA, the agents are: 
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• Map Aware:  They track their relative position on the terrain map, and to 
other agents through sensors and communication links. 
• Non-Uniform:  Agents can be defined uniquely with any number of 
different behavior parameters, weapons, sensors, communications links, 
and other capabilities. 
• Automata:  Agents can change states after defined trigger events.  In each 
state, an agent reacts independently, depending on its parameter settings. 
The MANA version 4 User’s Manual (2007) further explains: 
• MANA is in a general class of models called Agent-Based Models 
(ABMs).  ABMs have the characteristic of containing entities that 
are controlled by decision-making algorithms.  Hence, an agent-
based combat model contains entities representing military units 
that make their own decisions, as opposed to the modeller 
explicitly determining their behaviour in advance (p. 4). 
• To differentiate MANA (and ISAAC/EINSTein, etc.) from highly 
detailed models that can also use agents, MANA and the like are 
sometimes called Agent Based Distillations (ABDs).  This reflects 
the intention to model [only] the essence of a problem (p. 5). 
• MANA falls into a subset of these models, called cellular 
automaton (CA) models.  CA models have their origin in physics 
and biology.  The famous Ising model of magnetic spin alignment 
is an example of such a model in physics, while Conway’s ‘Game 
of Life’ is an example of a CA model designed to explore 
biological ideas (p. 5). 
• MANA and other CA models are often called complex adaptive 
systems (CAS) because of the way the entities within them react 
with their surrounding[s].  Some properties of MANA and CAS 
combat models generally are: 
o The “global” behaviour of the system “emerges” as the 
result of many local interactions. 
o They are an example of a process of feedback that is not 
present in “reductionist”, top-down models. 
o They cannot be analysed by decomposition into simple 
independent parts. 
o Agents interact with each other in non-linear ways, and 
“adapt” to their local environment. (p. 5) 
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• The MANA model is an attempt to create a complex adaptive 
system for some important real-world factors of combat such as: 
o Change of plans due to the evolving battle. 
o The influence of situational awareness when deciding  
an action. 
o The importance of sensors and how to use them to best 
advantage (p. 5). 
2. Why MANA? 
Since its introduction, MANA has been through a number of upgrades and is now 
a mature application with a user-friendly graphical user interface and wide range of 
capabilities.  MANA’s excellent user’s manual makes it easy to learn, and models can be 
rapidly built with full user control over agents, weapons, communications, and sensor 
parameters.  Additionally, the user has control over terrain and elevation settings, so the 
model can incorporate line-of-sight calculations, making scenarios more realistic.  The 
latest release, MANA version 5, incorporates a vector-based movement scheme, thus 
eliminating the need for the user to convert distance-related attributes into pixels 
(McIntosh, 2009).  The developers are responsive and many NPS theses have used 
MANA as their primary modeling tool. 
Because MANA is a non-physics-based distillation of reality, it is ideally suited 
for exploring the intangible aspects of combat.  This is primarily done using data farming 
techniques by running the simulation thousands of times, while changing parameters of 
interest in order to statistically evaluate the model’s MOEs.  MANA simulations are 
closed-form to allow for this type of analysis, and many desired MOEs are automatically 
reported in MANA’s output file.  MANA should be used to answer questions regarding 
trends, factors of possible importance, or a range of possibilities, rather than for giving 
precise estimates for predictive questions based on only a few runs of a model. 
MANA does have limitations.  Because there are so many variables, the user must 
be attentive to the interactions and consequences of model changes.  This requires 
incremental changes to the model during the building/debugging process, and even then, 
unexpected and inexplicable behavior can result.  While building the model for this 
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thesis, the author experienced this problem many times and had to find creative solutions.  
One such problem even led to the developers issuing an update to the software.  Details 
can be found in Appendix F.  
E. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SIMULATION MODEL 
This section describes how this thesis implements the previously described 
scenario in MANA.  It starts by describing the goal of the model and how it works 
conceptually.  It then follows with a description of model specifics including the terrain, 
enemy forces (red agents), friendly forces (blue agents), and the way in which logistics 
support is incorporated into the model.  Finally, this section concludes with the 
assumptions and abstractions necessary for this model. 
1. Goal 
This simulation models Alpha Company in their AOR near the end of Phase 2.  
The goal is to determine how effectively the MEU aviation assets are able to logistically 
support the enhanced company.  Specific MOEs are the amount of time that blue agents 
spend in a “fuel out” state (signifying that they are out of supplies) and the number of 
enemy killed (more is better).  Primary factors of interest include the MEU aircraft mix 
available to support the company, the distance from the company positions to the 
seabase, and the time required to launch a helicopter once a rapid support request is 
received.  By varying these and other factors, and by using the data analysis techniques 
discussed in the next chapter, this thesis will explore the logistical demand an enhanced 
company will have on a MEU’s aircraft. 
2. Conceptual Model 
This model can be represented as an inventory queuing model shown in Figure 8.  
There are three platoon positions within the Alpha Company AOR.  At each position 
there is a “supply tank” representing the supplies available to the platoon.  A supply unit 
is an aggregated entity, representing what one fire team would use in one day, and 
includes food, water, ammunition, fuel, etc.  Each fire team begins the simulation 
carrying one day of supply (DOS).  Each platoon supply tank holds enough supply units 
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to serve two additional DOS to every fire team at that position, so that there are a total of 
three DOS available at the beginning of the simulation.  As the simulation runs, the fire 
teams consume supplies at differing rates, depending on combat intensity.  When at least 
two of the three fire teams in a squad are out of supplies, they return to the supply tank.  
If the tank has supplies, it serves the squad.  When a supply tank runs out of supplies (i.e., 
the fire teams only have one carried DOS remaining), a request is sent to the MEU for a 
resupply.  If aircraft assets are available, they resupply the tank.  If a squad returns to a 
tank to find it empty (i.e., the resupply request is yet unfilled), it waits at the tank until it 
has been resupplied before continuing on its mission. 
 
Figure 8.   The scenario inventory queuing model. 
3. Terrain and Scale 
Because MANA is a time-step model, there must be a mapping from real time and 
space into simulation time and space.  This mapping affects agent movement speed, 
weapon ranges and firing rates, and sensor ranges among other parameters.  In MANA 
version 5, the user simply defines the battlefield dimensions in the units of his/her 
choosing and the spatial mapping needed for movement calculations is handled by the 
model. In the implementation of this scenario, the battlefield “Global Map Size” is  
 
 23
defined to be 33 kilometers wide by 27 kilometers high, as shown in Figure 9.  Once the 
battlefield size is set, there are three map layers that can be handled by MANA:  the 
background map, the terrain map, and the elevation map. 
 
Figure 9.   The model battlefield setting options in MANA version 5. 
The background map is a bitmap image that is solely for the user’s benefit and has 
no bearing on simulation calculations.  It is helpful for arraying forces on the battlefield, 
specifying waypoints, and setting up the terrain map among other things.  This simulation 
uses a 1:50,000 topographical map of the Alpha Company AOR as the background image 
as shown in Figure 10.  One nice feature of using a topographical map is the ease of 




Figure 10.   The simulation model background map [Best viewed in color]. 
MANA uses the terrain and elevation maps to determine a number of calculations 
as the scenario progresses.  Included in these are ease of movement and line of sight.  The 
terrain map is a bitmap image where various colors represent terrain features like walls, 
roads, hills, and vegetation.  The different colors correspond to ease of movement, as well 
as cover and concealment parameters for MANA agents.  For example, agents can be set 
to have a preference to move along easy routes, like roads, or towards cover when in 
enemy contact.  The elevation map is a bitmap image that uses gray-scale colors to 
signify elevation, which affects agent line-of-sight calculations.  Black is the lowest 
terrain and white is the highest.  In this simulation, the highest elevation is 1,060 meters 




another if there are no terrain features that provide concealment or elevation differences 
that would prevent the agents from having line of sight.  The simulation terrain and 
elevation maps can be seen in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11.   The terrain and elevation maps used by MANA [Best viewed in color]. 
The terrain characteristics used in this simulation can be seen in Figure 12.  For 
“Going,” a value of 1.00 means that agent movement is uninhibited by terrain, whereas a 
value of 0.00 means that an agent cannot move through or occupy that space.  Similar 
conditions apply to cover and concealment.  Values between the extremes are treated as 
different weightings, which are applied as multipliers against the other parameters 
affecting movement, visibility, and firing.  For example, an agent moves at 60% of 
maximum speed (going), has a 50% probability of not being seen (concealment), and a 
50% probability of the terrain blocking a shot (cover) per time step in forested terrain 
(assuming perfect enemy sensors and weapons).  The red-green-blue values determine the 
color of the terrain feature on the map. 
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Figure 12.   The simulation terrain characteristics. 
In addition to terrain calculations, MANA has the ability to model multiple 
seconds per time step.  This simulation uses 30 seconds per time step, but the agent 
movement speed conversions are done using Excel rather than MANA to avoid some 
abnormal behavior (see Appendix B).  This scenario runs for 14 days, which equates to 
40,320 time steps.  Because there are so many time steps, this scenario takes between 40 
and 60 minutes to run on modern computers, depending on the simulation parameter 
values. 
4. Red Force (Enemy Insurgents) 
Insurgents always begin their operations on the Razie side of the border (depicted 
by the river on the left side of the map in Figure 9).  Each agent icon represents a fire 
team-sized unit (typically four insurgents).  Their goal is to infiltrate across the border 
into Bunduri and move to one of three predetermined waypoints without being killed by 
the Marines.  When engaged by blue forces they will either attempt to break contact and 
continue to their waypoint or fight aggressively, depending on the simulation parameter 
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settings.  Each simulation day, three squads of red agents go active at differing times and 
move to one of the three waypoints.  The red agents’ route to the waypoint depends on its 
random starting position in its homebox.  In the experimental design, the number of red 
agents per group (each agent represents a fire team-sized element) varies from 1 to 15 
because 45 fire teams is about a company-sized unit, which is the maximum the MPF is 
capable of massing in the scenario.  A red unit’s fire power is equivalent to a blue unit’s; 
however, since the purpose of red units is simply to affect the blue unit’s consumption of 
supplies, a red agent is incapable of killing a blue agent, so the maximum amount of 
stress on the MEU supporting assets is always maintained. 
5. Blue Force (Marine Enhanced Company) 
Alpha Company is arrayed as shown in Figures 7 and 10.  There are three platoon 
positions:  1st, 2nd, and 3rd, from south to north, respectively.  Each platoon has three 
squads of three fire teams each.  Like the red agents, each blue icon in MANA represents 
a fire team, of which there are three per squad.  Since the scenario mission dictates that 
the enhanced company cover such a large AOR, at each position two squads continuously 
patrol to a set waypoint and return to the platoon base, while the other squad remains to 
provide base security.  In theory, one squad patrolling for six hours, providing base 
security for six hours (this would be considered “down time”), and then patrolling for 
another six hours is sustainable for a prolonged period of time.  Colonel Ed Lesnowicz, a 
retired Marine artillery officer with 36 years of experience, successfully used this scheme 
of maneuver during operations in Somalia (Colonel Lesnowicz, personal communication, 
May 2010).  Since a company is equipped with three 60mm mortar tubes, there is one 
mortar tube at each platoon position.  In addition, the company also has two 
Expeditionary Fire Support Systems (EFSS) co-located with the company headquarters 
and 2nd platoon.  The EFSS attachment is consistent with how an enhanced company 
would be deployed (personal conversation with Mr. Christopher C. Carolan, MCWL).  
The mortar teams and two EFSS support teams each represent a fire team’s worth of 
additional personnel. 
As the squads perform their missions, they use one unit of supply per time step.  
When their sensors detect enemy presence, they use two units of supply; when they are 
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engaged with the enemy, they use three units of supply per time step.  Varying supply 
usage due to differing levels of combat intensity is consistent with real-world operations 
(based on the author’s personal experience as a logistics officer during OIF).  While the 
platoon positions all start with three days of supply, they may actually consume the 
supplies much faster depending on the level of combat intensity, thus putting greater 
demand on the MEU’s supporting assets. 
6. Logistical Support 
In order to get the refueling behavior to work properly, this simulation creatively 
uses MANA’s state, sensor, and weapons capabilities.  As previously described, logistics 
support for the platoon positions is modeled as a supply tank that resupplies the squads.  
When a squad goes into a “fuel out” state, its primary behavior is to return to base for a 
resupply.  The fuel tank has a sensor that can see “fuel out” squads and a secondary 
“weapon” that can shoot them (this weapon does not kill or injure the blue agent, it 
simply triggers a state change).  When a squad is within range of the tank’s weapon, it is 
shot if the tank has ammunition (i.e., supplies) remaining.  When shot, the agent switches 
into the “shot at” state, refuels itself (using a negative refueling rate), and then continues 
on its mission.  When the tank has fired all of its ammunition, which is used to represent 
the tank’s supply capacity, it changes states into one visible by the resupply agent (the 
MEU aircraft), is shot at by the resupply agent, and reverts back into its default state with 
a full load of ammunition.  When a tank runs out of ammo, it must wait the amount of 
time it takes to load a helicopter and transit the distances to the platoon position from the 
seabase.  While this is occurring, any squads that need supplies will have to wait.  If they 
are not available to perform their missions, the red agents are less likely to be killed, 
which is why proportion of enemy killed and time in a fuel out state are key MOEs. 
7. Data Sources, Abstractions, Assumptions, and Validation 
Since it is not possible to model reality exactly, it is important to use data sources 
and assumptions that allow a model to be as accurate as possible, so that useful 
information may be gleaned from the simulation process.  This model uses a scenario 
provided by MCWL and validated by Colonel Goulding, whose input proved invaluable.  
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For example, when asked if an AOR of approximately 344 square miles would be 
realistic, he replied, “344 sq miles is hardly unrealistic; 3dBn 3dMar had an AOR of 
17,508 miles on its recent deployment…” (V. J. Goulding, personal communication, 
March 11, 2010).  In addition to validating the realism of the scenario, the author 
developed the MANA abstraction of the scenario in concert with other modeling and 
simulation experts.  Mary McDonald, a MANA expert and former Marine officer, 
understood the scenario and was instrumental in incorporating it into MANA.  The author 
also led a team of experienced modelers at the spring 2010 International Data Farming 
Workshop in Monterey, California, who assisted in model development.  This scenario 
demands a level of tracking precision that pushes MANA’s limits, so when limitations 
with MANA itself prevented further progress, Mark Anderson, a MANA developer, 
made required updates and produced a new version of MANA capable of running the 
desired model.  Finally, the model development was briefed weekly to  
Dr. Tom Lucas, Ph.D., a combat modeling expert at NPS.  The following paragraphs 
describe some modeling assumptions necessary for the simulation. 
This thesis needed to determine how many aircraft would be needed to supply two 
DOS to a platoon position.  Using planning factor data primarily provided by the 
Operations Analysis Division (OAD), Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
(see Appendix E), the total weight requirement for one platoon position per day is 4,483 
pounds, as shown in Table 1.  Additionally, Table 2 shows the specific weight 
calculations for ammunition, fuel, and water. 
Supply Class Description Lbs/Plt/Day Planning Factor Source
1 Food 268 OAD
1 Water 2806 OAD
2 Clothing 100 MAGTF Planner's Manual
2 Batteries 260 OAD
3 Fuel 158 Spreadsheet Analysis
4 Construction Materials 182 MAGTF Planner's Manual
5 Ammo 355 MCO 8010.1E
6 Personal Demand 163 MAGTF Planner's Manual
8 Medical Supplies 71 MAGTF Planner's Manual
9 Repair parts 120 OAD
Total Lbs/Plt/Day 4483
1 Day of Supply per Platoon (Plt) Weight Calculation 
 
Table 1.   The total weight requirements for one platoon of 48 Marines per day. 
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Item Weight (lbs)
Daily Assault Rate 
(MCO 8010.1E) Weapons per Plt Lbs/Plt/Day
5.56mm 0.026 8 30 6
40mm Grenade 0.5 3 10 15
5.56mm linked 0.031 27 10 8
60mm Smoke 4 9 1 36
60mm Illum 4 4 1 16
60mm HE 4 7 1 28
7.62mm linked 0.055 70 2 8
120mm Illum 30 3 0.66 59
120mm Smoke 30 4 0.66 79
120mm HE 30 5 0.66 99
Total Lbs/Plt/Day 355
ITV miles per gallon 17 Gallons/marine/day 7
Miles/day/ITV 50 Lbs/gallon 8.4
Lbs/gal JP8 6.7 Lbs/day/Marine 58.5
Lbs/day/ITV 20 Total Lbs/Plt/Day 2806
ITVs/platoon 8
Total Lbs/Plt/Day 158
Fuel Calculations per Platoon Water Calculations per Platoon
Ammo Calculations per Platoon (Plt)
 
Table 2.   The ammunition, fuel, and water weight requirements for one platoon of 48 
Marines per day. 
After consultation with an experienced Marine Corps helicopter pilot, who 
referred to the Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization Program 
Manual, it was determined that an MV-22 Osprey can transport at least 9,362 pounds of 
cargo to its maximum range in the given scenario conditions.  Similarly, a CH-53E can 
transport 18,000 pounds.  For simplicity, this model assumes that no cargo compatibility 
or bulk size limitations exist.  Under this assumption, one MV-22 is capable of carrying 
enough cargo to supply one platoon position, and a CH-53E can carry enough supplies 
for two. 
Other assumptions are related to communication, weapons, and rates of 
movement.  While MANA is capable of modeling communication shortfalls, for this 
scenario all communications are assumed to work perfectly throughout the AOR. 
Movement speed and weapon firing rates are based on 30 seconds real time per time step.  
Because the movement rate and weapon firing rate conversions are handled outside of 
MANA, they are provided in Appendices B and C.  Weapon ranges and firing rates are 
aggregated at the fire-team level using data found on http://globalsecurity.org and 
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www.fas.org.  Blue and red fire teams have the same capabilities, unless blue patrolling 
squads are considered to be mounted in vehicles.  Under this case, blue weapon ranges 
and firing rates are extended to be commensurate with mounted crew-served machine gun 
parameters.  When foot mobile, both red and blue agents move at 5 kilometers per hour 
(kph).  When blue agents are mounted on vehicles, they move at 56 kph.  Other 
parameters that could directly impact the model’s outcome are varied in the experimental 
design, as described in Chapter III. 
F. SUMMARY 
ECO represents the cutting edge in evolving infantry tactics as the Marine Corps 
strives to meet future challenges.  This research uses the MANA version 5 simulation 
tool to model a realistic scenario that an enhanced company could encounter.  Within the 
context of this scenario model, an experimental design is used to explore the demand that 
an enhanced company may have on a MEU’s supporting aircraft. 
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III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In a simulation study, the manner in which the experiments are conducted is very 
important.  If a simulation is run once under a given set of variables, the output will not 
reveal which factors are important.  If a simulation is run multiple times while varying 
the input parameters in an ad hoc way, the output will reveal which changes result, but 
may not reveal why those changes occurred.  However, if a systematic design of 
experiments approach is used, the simulation can be run many times, varying the input 
parameters in such a way that the experimenter is able to draw conclusions about cause 
and effect from the analyzed results.  There are different design choices depending on the 
model’s limitations, the questions of interest, and the time available.  Because it would be 
very time consuming (or impossible) to explore every possible combination of design 
factors, this research uses a robust DOE method, the Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube 
(NOLH), which is explained here.  This research also uses an analytical technique known 
as data farming.  Developed under MCWL’s Project Albert in 1998, data farming is an 
innovative concept that entails running a relatively simple model, like the one used here, 
many times, while systematically changing input parameters (Brandstein & Horne, 1998).  
The resulting data set is then explored statistically to see what patterns and other 
behaviors emerge.  This process can highlight interesting and useful areas of the feasible 
space and answer many “what if” questions.  Additionally, the analyst can perform this 
technique iteratively to focus on specific parameters and/or questions. 
This chapter defines the variables of interest that are changed as the simulation 
experiment runs, explains the NOLH, and describes the experimental designs this thesis 
uses to explore and understand the logistical impact an enhanced company will have on a 
MEU. 
B. VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
This section describes the parameters, or design factors, varied during this 
experiment.  There are two types of factors used:  controllable and uncontrollable.  
 34
Controllable factors (often called decision factors) are those that can be controlled by 
friendly decision makers, whereas uncontrollable ones cannot.  Uncontrollable factors 
(also known as noise factors), like weather or enemy actions, have an impact on output 
variability, so they are included in the design.  While some factors could arguably fall 
into both categories, this study does not allow it.  For example, an aircraft’s speed can be 
fully controlled by the pilot, but poor weather may limit the speed range the pilot can use.  
To avoid confusion, this thesis considers decision factors as those typically controllable 
by the Marines, and noise factors as those typically controlled by the enemy.  The 
decision and noise factors are summarized in Table 3. 
Factor Range Description
Aircraft Mix Categorical 1..6 The Aircraft combination used by the MEU to 
support the enhanced company.
Sea Base Distance 50 to 200 miles in 
10 mile increments
The distance of the sea base to the enhanced 
company.
Response Time 30 to 180 mins in 
30 min increments
The time, in minutes, between the MEU 
receiving the rapid request for support and 
when the helicopter departs the sea base.
EFSS Max Range 8k or 14k meters The maximum range of the EFSS system 
depending on if rocket assisted projectiles are 
used.
Mounted/Dismount Patrol Categorical 0 or 1 A binary categorical variable to determine if 
blue patrolling squads are mounted in 
vehicles.  If mounted, speed, firing rates, and 
sensor ranges all increase.
Number of Agents per Red Squad 1..15 The number of fire team agents per red squad.
Red Aggressiveness Categorical 0 or 1 A binary categorical variable controlling red 
agent aggressiveness.  If aggressive, the red 
desire to move towards blue agents increases 
from 0% to 70%.
Red Movement Speed in Contact 
States
0..5 kph The speed red agents move when in contact 
with blue agents.
Red Hits to Kill 1..5 hits The number of times a blue agent must hit a 
red agent to kill it.  
Table 3.   The variable factors in the experimental design.  Decision factors are 
highlighted in blue and noise factors are highlighted in red [Best viewed in color]. 
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1. Decision Factors 
a. Aircraft Mix 
Previous analysis calculated the weight of supplies each platoon requires 
per day at 4,483 lbs (see Chapter II, Section 7).  In order to fill a rapid request of two 
DOS, an aircraft must deliver 8,966 lbs.  A MEU composite squadron rates 12 MV-22 
Ospreys and 4 CH-53E Sea Stallions.  Based on the weight requirement, either platform 
is capable of resupplying a platoon.  In fact, a CH-53E is capable of carrying enough 
supplies for two platoon positions.  If a MEU commander allocates three MV-22s or two 
CH-53s, there would be sufficient aircraft to resupply all three platoon positions daily 
without breaking aircrew rest constraints.  Of course, a MEU commander can allocate as 
few as one aircraft to support the company, so this categorical factor defines what 





3 1 MV-22; 1 CH-53
4 2 MV-22s; 1 CH-53
5 3 MV-22s
6 2 CH-53s  
Table 4.   Aircraft mix combinations. 
b. Seabase Distance 
In this scenario, the company positions are approximately 80 miles from 
the notional coastline.  Figure 13 shows this relationship.  The seabase supporting the 
company could be right off the coast, or it could be further out to sea to take advantage of 
the protection an over-the-horizon position affords. 
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Figure 13.   The distance from the Alpha Company headquarters to the notional coastline. 
In order to explore a wider range of possibilities than the scenario 
naturally offers, this decision factor is varied between 50 and 200 miles in 10-mile 
increments.  This factor affects the time delay a tank must wait to get refueled depending 
on the travel speed of the helicopter serving the tank. 
While 200 miles is well within the combat radius of an MV-22, it exceeds 
the publicized combat radius of a CH-53E.  However, Sikorsky, the helicopter’s 
manufacturer, gave a brief at the Expeditionary Warfare Conference in 2001, advertising 
a future capability to lift 28,000 lbs for 200 nautical miles (nm).  See Figure 14 for a 
PowerPoint slide from that presentation.  It is also possible to conduct aerial refueling 
using tanker aircraft.  This makes the 200-mile radius a reasonable number to explore, 
even when considering CH-53Es. 
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Figure 14.   PowerPoint slide showing CH-53E future capability to lift 28,000 lbs for 200 
nautical miles (From:  Expeditionary Warfare Conference PowerPoint Brief, 
2001) [Best viewed in color]. 
c. Response Time 
This defines the time delay from the MEU receiving the rapid request to 
the helicopter taking off with the supplies.  This factor combines with the distance-based 
travel time to determine how long a platoon position must wait for a resupply.  In 
MANA, when a helicopter’s sensor sees an empty tank (i.e., the MEU gets the resupply 
request), it goes into a delay state to account for the response time and one-way travel 
time.  Once that period has expired, it briefly goes into a state capable of resupplying the 
tank.  After the tank has been resupplied, the helicopter goes into another delay state to 
account for the travel time back to the MEU before it can be summoned again. 
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d. EFSS Max Range 
If the Marines have rocket-assisted projectiles, the maximum range of the 
EFSS is 14 kilometers (km); otherwise it is 8 km. 
e. Mounted/Dismounted Patrol 
This factor is binary categorical variable to determine if blue patrolling 
squads are mounted in vehicles.  A number of parameters are lock-stepped with this 
variable.  If mounted, speed, firing rates, and sensor ranges all increase to account for the 
improved mobility, crew-served weapons, and higher vantage points vehicles offer. 
2. Noise Factors 
These are uncontrollable by blue forces.  The purpose of these factors is to vary 
the level of combat intensity and the demand placed on the MEU’s assets. 
a. Number of Agents per Red Squad  
This is the number of fire team agents per red squad.  The range is from  
1 to 15. 
b. Red Agent Aggressiveness 
This factor defines how aggressive red agents are when they are in contact 
with blue agents.  The values are either 0% aggressive, which means they want to break 
contact with blue agents, or they are 70% aggressive and will want to fight blue agents. 
c. Red Agent Movement Speed in Contact States 
This factor determines how fast red agents move when they are in contact 
with blue agents.  The range is from 0 to 5 kph. 
d. Number of Hits to Kill 
This factor varies the number of hits it takes a blue agent to kill a red 
agent.  The range is from 1 to 5 hits. 
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C. THE EXPERIMENTS 
This thesis uses an iterative approach to build the experiments.  First, it builds a 
MANA model, tests and debugs the model, and runs a trial experiment.  Then, it fine 
tunes the design and runs another experiment.  Finally, it selects variables of interest to 
focus on and runs subexperiments for more detailed analysis of the design space.  This 
section begins by describing the foundation of the experimental design, the NOLH.  It 
then describes the iterative experiment process in detail. 
1. The Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) 
This research uses the NOLH space-filling experimental design technique 
developed by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Cioppa, USA, at NPS in 2002.  The NOLH 
technique lets the experimenter efficiently explore the design space of a large number of 
variables in a relatively small number of runs using nearly orthogonal design columns 
(Cioppa, 2002).  A design point is a unique vector of values corresponding to the variable 
factors and their respective range of possible values.  When using a full factorial design 
(every possible vector is considered), the number of design points can quickly become 
unwieldy, if not practically impossible, to deal with.  For example, using just the high and 
low values of the factors listed in Table 3 would require 29 or 512 design points.  This 
experiment explores the same factors using 129 design points, without being limited to 
just high and low values.  This difference becomes significant because one replication 
can take up to an hour to run.  By keeping the design columns nearly orthogonal, the 
correlation, or linear relationship, between factors stays low so parameter estimates using 
a linear regression model can be estimated nearly independently.  For additional details, 
including the algorithms behind the NOLH technique, the reader is directed to  
LTC Cioppa’s dissertation. 
2. Experimental Design 
This research uses a spreadsheet tool developed by Professor Susan Sanchez of 
the Operations Research Department at NPS to generate the NOLH design.  This tool can 
generate designs using up to 29 factors with 257 design points (Sanchez, 2005).  Using 
the design factors and ranges in Table 3, the NOLH tool produced a 129-point design 
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(represented in Figure 15), and a scatter plot matrix showing the NOLH nearly-
orthogonal and space-filling properties.  Each box depicts the pairwise projections of the 
design points for two factors.  When the boxes are filled with data points, the design 
samples across the ranges of the two factors, and the space-filling property is apparent.  
Boxes that show just a few bands of data points correspond to discrete factors and still 
show that most if not all pairwise combinations are accounted for.  Had there been any 
highly correlated pairs, a linear dependence would have been obvious.  An analysis 
showed the highest absolute correlation between any two factors to be 0.089.  This helps 
to ensure that confounding effects are minimal in the model. 
 
Figure 15.   A scatter plot matrix of the experimental design. 
For this design, each design point is replicated 20 times with a different random 
number seed.  Each design point vector of factor values was used in the MANA ECO 
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model, so a total of 2,580 battles were simulated.  An initial analysis showed that 
helicopter mix and distance to seabase were being dominated by other variables, so a 
subexperiment that held all variables constant except for helicopter mix and distance to 
seabase was run 30 times for each design point.  The subexperiment used a 96-point,  
full-factorial design because of the greatly reduced input space.  Table 5 shows the factor 
values that were held constant.  A detailed discussion of why this subexperiment was 
conducted is found in Chapter IV.  Detailed tables of the experimental designs are found 
in Appendices F and G. 
Factor Subexperiment
Helicopter Mix 1..6
Seabase Distance 50 to 200 miles by 10
Response Time 1 hr
EFSS Max Range 8,000 km
Mounted/Dismount Patrol Dismounted
Number of Agents per Red Squad 8
Red Aggressiveness 70%
Red Movement Speed in Contact 
States 3 kph
Red Hits to Kill 2  
Table 5.   The fixed values for the subexperiment.  Variable factors and their ranges are 
in bold.  Decision factors are highlighted in blue, and noise factors are highlighted 
in red [Best viewed in color]. 
D. RUNNING THE EXPERIMENT 
Running this experiment using MANA is a relatively straightforward process.  
The base case MANA scenario, in eXtensible Markup Language (XML) format, and the 
DOE file, in comma-separated value (CSV) format, were entered into a software program 
called XStudy, written by SEED Center Research Associate Steve Upton, which enables 
the user to map each column in the design file to a specific parameter in MANA, using 
XPaths.  Other details about the study design, such as version of MANA and number of 
replications per design point, are also entered into this tool, yielding a single Study.xml 
file.  This file is used by another program called oldmcdata, also written by Steve Upton, 
which automatically updates the MANA XML file, producing a separate XML scenario 
file for each of the different factor combinations, and then launches these on a high-
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performance computing cluster.  This is done to automate the parallel implementation of 
the MANA simulated runs and subsequently collect the output data into a single  
CSV file. 
Since the memory requirement for running this scenario was high, these XML 
files were then ran on a cluster of the 37 highest-performing processors owned and 
operated by the SEED Center at NPS.  Each replication took approximately 35 minutes 
using a single processor.  One hundred twenty-nine design points, with 20 replications 
each, equates to 2,580 simulation runs.  This number of runs would have taken over  
62 days to complete using a single processor.  Using the 37-processor cluster, however, it 
took just under 5 days, emphasizing the advantage of using NOLH experimental design 
in combination with the computational power of the cluster. 
The 129-point design described above was actually the second design this study 
ran.  The first was a 257-point design that ran 40 replications for each design point.  The 
experiment ran for over 10 days using all of the processors, including those with less 
memory.  However, only 5,764 of 10,280 runs returned valid data.  It turned out that the 
processors with less memory could not handle the simulation, so those processors were 
excluded, modifications were made to the model, and the number of design points was 
reduced to complete the experiment under the given time constraints (M. McDonald, 
personal communication, June 4, 2010). 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
Using the experimental design described in Chapter III, MANA produced a large 
amount of data.  This chapter describes the data collection and processing procedure, and 
provides a detailed analysis of the collected data. 
A. DATA COLLECTION AND POST PROCESSING 
One of the key advantages of using MANA is that it automatically produces 
output files for the desired MOEs.  For each replication, MANA can also produce a set of 
“step” files which contain additional information about the run.  For example, the 
“agentstates” step file includes the number of hits taken by each agent in the scenario, as 
well as the number of shots taken with each of an agent's weapons.  After the set of runs 
for a study is complete, the “agentstates” files are collected and run through an Excel 
VBA script which loops through each of the files and computes the Total Time Awaiting 
Fuel and Total Sorties.  These MOEs are then appended to the summary output file that 
MANA produces. 
When the MANA experiment is combined with the SEED Center  
high-performance computing cluster, collecting the data is an automated process.  When 
the experiment is complete, a single CSV file is generated containing variable factor 
input values and MOE output values.  This CSV file is then imported into an analytical 
program like JMP or S-Plus.  Once imported, the data are culled and arranged into a 
manageable table.  Post-processing involves computing MOEs not directly reported by 
MANA.  For example, the proportion of red agents killed is computed by dividing the 
number killed by the number the simulation started with for each design point.  Other 
post-processing measures include “batching” the design point replications and/or other 
necessary steps for analysis.  Batching refers to averaging the replication values over 
each design point.  For example, this thesis ran the first experiment for 20 replications for 
each design point and a second experiment for 30 replications for each design point.  The 
average of each design point parameter is batched and used for analysis.  This technique 
helps to ensure the signal is seen through the noise in a stochastic model.  The reader is 
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directed to Alexopulos and Seila, 1998, for more information on batched means.  
Throughout the remainder of this chapter, this research uses JMP Statistical Discovery 
Software version 8.0.1 to conduct this analysis. 
B. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE) 
In any experiment, it is important to evaluate the correct performance measures to 
answer the questions at hand.  This research uses three primary MOEs:  proportion of 
enemy killed (the reader is reminded that red agents cannot kill blue agents—see  
Chapter II.F.4), total time awaiting supplies, and total sorties flown.  To ensure all MOEs 
are measuring different aspects of the scenario, the scatter plot matrix in Figure 16 shows 
that strong linear relationships do not exist between them.  The highest correlation, or 
measure of a linear relationship, is 0.14, so all three MOEs should be used to evaluate the 
questions above.  Absolute correlation below 0.5 is generally considered a tolerable level 
of linear dependence for analysis (T. W. Lucas, personal communication, June 2010).  
The astute reader will notice that there are only 107 rather than 129 data points 
considered in Figure 16.  This is explained in Section C of this chapter. 
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Figure 16.   A scatter plot matrix of the measures of effectiveness. 
1. Proportion of Enemy Killed 
As previously discussed, this MOE is calculated to be the proportion of enemy 
that blue agents kill.  When blue agents are in the “fuel out” state, meaning they have run 
out of supplies, they become combat ineffective and are not able to see or shoot red 
agents.  The longer they are in this state, the better chance a red agent has of making it to 
its objective without being killed, so this MOE is used to evaluate the effectiveness of 
blue agent’s ability to kill red agents.  Other factors, like whether or not blue agents are 
mounted on vehicles, may also impact this MOE.  This proportion may be presented as a 
percentage for readability. 
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2. Total Time Awaiting Supplies 
This MOE is used to evaluate the MEU’s ability to keep the company supplied.  
When a blue agent goes into a “fuel out” state, it returns to the base supply tank for a 
resupply.  If the supply tank is empty, the blue agent shoots a secondary “counter” 
weapon once each second until it receives supplies.  MANA tracks this MOE by 
summing the number of rounds each agent shoots over the simulation, so this MOE is the 
total number of seconds all blue agents had to wait on supplies.  Because each second of 
simulation time computes to 30 seconds of real time, this figure could be multiplied by 30 
to reflect the real time (in seconds) that all blue agents were out of fuel.  However, since 
this is a linear transformation, it has no impact on the analysis, so the numbers are left as 
MANA reports them.  What is important in this abstraction is the total waiting time; 
obviously, less is better. 
3. Total Sorties Flown 
This MOE is used to evaluate the demand the company places on the MEU’s 
resources.  Aircraft have a secondary counter weapon that shoots a single shot at a 
dummy agent (that only it can see) each time it flies a mission, so MANA can track the 
total number of sorties. 
C. ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT OUTPUT 
This section conducts a top-down analysis of the MANA output, primarily using 
partition trees and a multiple regression model to evaluate the MOEs.  Partition trees are 
a nonparametric method for evaluating relationships between input variables and the 
response variable.  One advantage of partition trees is their relatively intuitive format, 
coupling high explanatory power with ease of communication.  The data starts out in one 
grouping and is iteratively “split” into groups that have different means with lower 
standard deviations than the group had before the split.  This has the effect of increasing 
the R2, a measure of how much variability in the data is explained by the model.  Each 
split produces more “branches,” or smaller groups in the tree, and should increase the R2.  
The reader is directed to Kleijnen, Sanchez, Lucas, and Cioppa, 2005 for more 
information on partition trees. 
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Because MANA is a distillation model, for this analysis, the specific values for 
the partition tree splits or the regression model coefficients do not necessarily matter as 
much as the overall importance the input variables have in the model and the 
understanding they provide.  This section starts with a basic statistical summary of the 
MOEs and then discusses several models based on the experiment’s output. 
1. Data Summary 
The first MOE this section considers is proportion of enemy killed.  Using the 
batched 129-design-point data, a simple distribution plot of this MOE (see Figure 17) 
actually reveals a modeling error.  It should be nearly impossible that zero enemies are 
killed; however, the plot shows that it occurs in 22 of the 129 cases, or 17% of the time.  
Further investigation revealed that the “red movement speed in contact state” factor was 
entered into the design file incorrectly.  The original design called for red agents to move 
at a constant default rate of 5 kph until they made contact with blue agents.  In the contact 
states, the speed should have been varied from 0 to 5 kph to affect combat intensity.  
Instead of varying the red agent speed only when in contact with blue, the default speed 
was also varied from 0 to 5 kph throughout all states in the simulation.  This means when 
the speed was set to 0, the red agents did not move towards their waypoints, so they never 
had a chance to be killed by blue agents.  Fortunately, the NOLH design’s robustness 
allows for continued analysis.  Here, and in subsequent pages, graphs are presented as 
screen shots from JMP. 
 
Figure 17.   The distribution of proportion of enemy killed using the 129-design-point 
data. 
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When the 22 0-kph cases are excluded from the data, 107 design points remain.  
An analysis of the factor distributions reveals a reasonably even spread among their 
ranges.  Furthermore, the highest absolute pairwise correlation between the design points 
is 0.14, which is still acceptably low.  The scatter-plot matrix in Figure 18 shows that the 
107 design points are still sufficiently space filling.  Because time constraints did not 
allow this experiment to be rerun, from this point forward, this thesis only discusses 
analysis of the 107 design point data, unless otherwise noted.  The MOE distributions and 
summary statistics are found in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 18.   A scatter plot matrix of 107 design point data. 
 49
 
Figure 19.   The MOE distributions and summary statistics. 
2. Partition Trees 
This section considers the insight provided by analyzing the MOE output using 
partition trees.  The partition trees were built using the MOEs as the response variable 
and the nine design factors as the input variables. 
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a. Proportion of Enemy Killed 
The first partition tree this research considers uses the proportion of red 
killed as the response.  The first split, which explains 59% of the model variability, 
occurs when the red agent speed is less than two kph or greater than or equal to two kph.  
When the red agent speed is greater than two kph, which occurs in 21 of the 107 design 
points, the average proportion of red agents killed is approximately 83%.  Otherwise, the 
proportion is approximately 62%.  This finding simply indicates that slower red agents 
are easier to kill.  The second split (see Figure 20) divides the two-kph-or-greater group 
in two, based on whether or not the blue agents were mounted on vehicles.  When 
mounted (indicated by the number 1), the increased speed and weapons ranges make blue 
more efficient at killing red.  Further branches of this tree reveal similar variations to this 
theme.  These results may not be surprising, but it is nice when a model supports 
intuition.  For this MOE, enemy speed and blue lethality dominate resupply factors. 
 
Figure 20.   The proportion of red killed partition tree with two splits. 
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b. Total Time Awaiting Supplies 
The next MOE considered is total time awaiting supplies.  One side 
benefit of the previously discussed modeling error is that there are 22 design points in 
which blue agents did not come into contact with red agents.  This data provides a  
quasi-baseline of what the average time awaiting supplies would be without enemy 
contact.  The distribution of these 22 design points is shown in Figure 21.  The outlier is 
likely caused by that data point’s parameters.  It has the highest response time value, 
three hours, and it only has one CH-53, the slower helicopter, in its aircraft mix.  Note 
that the average waiting time is significantly less than the average time found in  
Figure 19.  It is also notable that both distributions have a high degree of variability. 
 
Figure 21.   The distribution and summary statistics for total time awaiting fuel under the 
22 design points that blue agents encountered no enemy contact. 
Interestingly, the first split in partition trees for both cases is on rapid 
request response time.  While it is not prudent to continue splitting the 22-point data 
because of the small number of data points, further splits of the 107-point data reveal this 
factor’s importance.  In fact, the first two splits, together accounting for approximately 
53% of the model variability, are on rapid request response time.  The first split is at  
150 minutes, or 2.5 hours, and the second splits the less-than-150-minute branch at  
90 minutes.  The difference in means between these splits is substantial and can be seen 
in Figure 22.  The longer the response time, the longer blue agents have to wait on 
supplies.  The third split occurs when number of red agents per squad is either less than 
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or greater than/equal to nine agents per squad.  When there are nine or more, the blue 
agents wait longer for supplies because the combat intensity is higher.  The fourth split is 
back to rapid request response time.  All four splits can be seen in Figure 22.  These last 
two splits only account for an additional 4% of the model variability.  What is of note is 
what does not appear in the tree until the sixth split:  distance to seabase.  The response 
time dominates this factor because the distance to the seabase affects the wait due to 
travel time.  Even in the most extreme case, when the seabase is 200 statute miles from 
the company, the slowest aircraft considered—the CH-53E—can still traverse that 
distance in approximately 70 minutes, which is easily dominated when compared to a 2-3 
hour response time. 
 
Figure 22.   The partition tree at four splits for total time awaiting supplies using the  
107-design-point data. 
c. Total Sorties Flown 
The summary statistics in Figure 19 show the average total sorties flown 
to be approximately 16, with a relatively low standard deviation.  The 22-point data with 
no enemy contact shows much the same thing.  The partition tree for this MOE splits on 
noise factors until the fifth split where it spits on distance to seabase; however, the splits 
this deep in the tree are not explaining enough of the marginal model variability to be 
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significant.  It is likely that the number of sorties flown is relatively constant because this 
scenario only runs for 14 simulated days.  Since the tanks only need to be supplied every 
three days or so, there are really only 4-5 opportunities for a tank to go empty, depending 
on combat intensity.  When multiplied by three tanks in the model, the average of 16 total 
sorties is reasonable given the different aircraft mixes considered. 
3. A Multiple Regression Model 
Since the most interesting MOE appears to be total time awaiting supplies, this 
thesis considerers a multiple regression model run using mixed stepwise regression.  The 
model was built using JMP’s model builder tool, and all nine main effects, pairwise 
interactions, and second degree polynomial terms were considered.  To avoid model 
over-fitting, the t-ratio p-values were set to less than 0.05 to enter and leave the model.  
This model’s purpose is simply to divulge important factors and interactions.  It is not 
intended to be used for prediction.  Figure 23 shows the model coefficient estimates, and, 
more importantly, it shows that the model confirms the partition tree results that the rapid 
request response time dominates this MOE. 
 
Figure 23.   The total time awaiting supplies multiple regression model parameter 
estimates. 
One parameter in the model deserves special note.  The aircraft mix case category 
was split into two groups.  One group contains aircraft mix cases 1, 3, 4, and 5, while the 
other contains cases 2 and 6.  A check of Table 4 shows the difference between the cases 
to be the inclusion of the MV-22.  Cases 2 and 6 do not include an MV-22, while the 
others do.  Figure 24, which shows the interaction profiles for the factors that interact, 
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indicates why this split is important.  Each box in this figure has total time awaiting fuel 
on the y-axis and the factor in the column on the x-axis.  The factor in the row divides the 
two lines in each box based on that row factor’s high and low values.  When the two lines 
are not parallel, an interaction between the row and column variable exists.  An 
interaction is when the level of one variable positively or negatively affects the impact of 
the other variable on the response.  For example, in the plot displayed in the first row, 
fourth column, there is an interaction between the aircraft mix case split and the number 
of red agents per squad.  In general, the aircraft mix split with the MV-22 (the blue line) 
reduces the time blue agents wait on supplies, but this difference is less pronounced when 
there are fewer red agents per squad (i.e., when combat intensity is lower).  The aircraft 
mix case split is due to the difference in speed between the MV-22 and CH-53E— 
240 nm per hour versus 150 nm per hour, respectively.  When the MV-22 is not present 
in the aircraft mix, the blue agents must wait longer for the  
CH-53E to traverse the distance to the seabase.  The importance of the MV-22 becomes 
even more apparent in the subexperiment discussed next. 
 
Figure 24.   The total time awaiting supplies multiple regression model interaction profile 
plot [Best viewed in color]. 
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4. The Subexperiment 
Since rapid request response time clearly dominated the total time awaiting 
supplies MOE, this thesis ran a subexperiment to further investigate the affect that 
distance to seabase and aircraft mix have on the model.  In this experiment, only those 
two variables were changed.  Since there are 16 possible levels of distance to seabase and 
only six possible aircraft mix combinations, this experiment used a full-factorial, 96-point 
design to evaluate every possible combination of factors.  All other model variables were 
held constant at the levels indicated in Table 5.  Thirty replications were done for each of 
the 96 design points, for a total of 2,880 simulated missions.  These outputs were batched 
into their average values for analysis, just as was done in the first experiment.  The 
distribution and summary statistics for the total time awaiting fuel using the 
subexperiment data is found in Figure 25.  Note, that the model variability is much lower, 
as expected. 
 
Figure 25.   The distribution and summary statistics for total time awaiting fuel using the 
subexperiment data. 
Using a partition tree to evaluate the data, the first split is on aircraft mix case.  
This split divides cases 4 and 5 from cases 1, 2, 3, and 6.  Another check of Table 4 
indicates that the primary difference between these cases is the number of aircraft in the 
mix.  Cases 4 and 5 each have three aircraft, but, more importantly, they each have two or 
more MV-22s, so the blue agents wait substantially less time for supplies.  The next two 
splits are on the distance to the seabase.  If there are two or more MV-22s in the mix, the 
split occurs at 130 miles; otherwise the split occurs at 110 miles.  Interestingly, the 
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average time awaiting supplies when the seabase is greater than or equal to 130 miles is 
still less than when it is less than the 110-mile distance, when there are one or fewer  
MV-22s in the mix.  This comparison once again drives the point that the MV-22 
provides a key advantage when supporting units from the seabase using a rapid request 
system.  The fourth split divides the greater-than-or-equal-to-110 miles branch by aircraft 
mix.  Once again the MV-22 cases (1 and 3) are separated from the CH-53E cases (2 and 
6).  Figure 26 shows the partition tree just discussed.  The following chapter summarizes 
these results and draws the relevant conclusions this analysis provides. 
 
 
Figure 26.   The partition tree at four splits for total time awaiting supplies using the  
96-point subexperiment data. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
This research’s purpose is to evaluate the affect that supporting an enhanced 
company would have on a MEU’s logistical supporting assets.  This chapter revisits the 
original research questions proposed in Chapter I and provides analytically-based insights 
that answer those questions. 
A. INSIGHTS INTO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Recall from Chapter I that this research seeks to gain insight into four questions 
relating to the logistical supportability of an enhanced company, operating in an austere 
and hostile environment.  They are directly answered here. 
1. Given the current organizational structure of an MEU, what is the 
logistical impact of supporting an enhanced company with the MEU’s 
supporting assets? 
Most importantly, this research shows that it is possible to support an enhanced 
company using its current logistical assets under the assumptions of this scenario.  While 
the logistical demand is approximated, the MEU’s aircraft are capable of transporting the 
quantity of supplies an enhanced company is likely to consume.  Additionally, the 
number of sorties required to support an enhanced company over a 2-week period 
remained relatively stable. 
The key MOE, total time awaiting supplies, ranges from 461 to 8,988 time steps 
using a three-DOS rapid request model.  Since this MOE is an aggregate of all 33 agents 
that demand supplies, it equates to a real-time range of 7 to 136 minutes per agent.  For 
example, ((461 time steps aggregated wait time * 30 seconds/time step) ÷ 60 
seconds/minute) ÷ 33 agents = 6.98 minutes per agent wait time.  While it is not 
acceptable for a combat unit to ever run out of supplies, these figures come from a model 




2. What are the critical logistical factors relating to mission success 
during ECO within the context of a given scenario? 
The second experiment showed that the lowest average time awaiting supplies 
occurs when three aircraft, at least two of which being MV-22s, were used.  Allocating 
one aircraft per platoon position yielded optimal results.  Since increased combat 
intensity increased demand on MEU assets, this research also substantiates the need for 
reserve or surge capacity. 
3. What are the critical logistical capabilities of the MEU that will 
enable it to provide continuous sustainment to an enhanced company? 
This research reconfirms the logistical advantage the MV-22’s speed and range 
provides.  If all other parameters are equal, using MV-22s enable a seabase to be further 
away from the supported unit than using CH-53s, while still providing the same level of 
support.  This simple fact validates the MV-22’s contribution to the viability of the 
seabase concept. 
4. What is the logistical impact of increasing the distance of the 
supported unit from the seabase? 
As expected, increasing the supported unit’s distance to the seabase increases wait 
time, but response time to rapid requests easily dominated this factor.  The graph in 
Figure 27 illustrates this phenomenon.  Logistical planners should work to minimize 
response time by taking steps such as building prepackaged supply bundles in 
anticipation of requests.  This finding also provides a strong argument for incorporating 
scheduled resupply into the concept of support. 
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Figure 27.   Total Time Awaiting Supplies versus Distance to Seabase by Rapid Request 
Response Time. 
B. FOLLOW-ON WORK 
Due to time constraints, this research had to limit the number of simulated 
missions run on the SEED Center computer cluster.  The modeling error discussed in 
Chapter IV should be corrected, and these experiments should be rerun, using both more 
design points and more replications per design point, to increase the statistical power of 
the analysis.  Once these runs are complete, the analysis should be conducted once again 
to determine if more specific insight can be found. 
The MANA model developed for this research can be adapted to explore many 
other questions.  For example, it could be used to evaluate a scheduled resupply model, 
which could reveal that the CH-53’s cargo capacity advantages trump the MV-22’s speed 
advantage under that circumstance.  This model could also be adapted to explore other 
aircraft options, like cargo unmanned aerial systems or C-130 air delivery capabilities, or 
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APPENDIX A.  SCENARIO TIME CONVERSIONS 
This appendix contains the spreadsheets used to perform real-time conversions 
into MANA simulation time. 
14 336 20160 0.5000 40320
Minutes In Scenario
Total Time Steps 
in ScenarioDays in Scenario Hours In Scenario
Minutes per Time 
Step
 






3 360  
Distance in Miles Flight Time in Sec. Time Steps 60 120 180 240 300 360
50 652 22 82 142 202 262 322 382
60 782 26 86 146 206 266 326 386
70 912 30 90 150 210 270 330 390
80 1043 35 95 155 215 275 335 395
90 1173 39 99 159 219 279 339 399
100 1303 43 103 163 223 283 343 403
110 1434 48 108 168 228 288 348 408
120 1564 52 112 172 232 292 352 412
130 1694 56 116 176 236 296 356 416
140 1825 61 121 181 241 301 361 421
150 1955 65 125 185 245 305 365 425
160 2085 70 130 190 250 310 370 430
170 2215 74 134 194 254 314 374 434
180 2346 78 138 198 258 318 378 438
190 2476 83 143 203 263 323 383 443
200 2606 87 147 207 267 327 387 447
MV-22 Conversions @ 240 knot cruise speed Total Rapid Request Response Delay (in time steps)
  
Distance in Miles Flight Time in Sec. Time Steps 60 120 180 240 300 360
50 1043 35 95 155 215 275 335 395
60 1251 42 102 162 222 282 342 402
70 1460 49 109 169 229 289 349 409
80 1668 56 116 176 236 296 356 416
90 1877 63 123 183 243 303 363 423
100 2085 70 130 190 250 310 370 430
110 2294 76 136 196 256 316 376 436
120 2502 83 143 203 263 323 383 443
130 2711 90 150 210 270 330 390 450
140 2919 97 157 217 277 337 397 457
150 3128 104 164 224 284 344 404 464
160 3336 111 171 231 291 351 411 471
170 3545 118 178 238 298 358 418 478
180 3753 125 185 245 305 365 425 485
190 3962 132 192 252 312 372 432 492
200 4170 139 199 259 319 379 439 499
CH-53E Conversions @ 150 knot cruise speed Rapid Request Response Delay (in time steps)
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APPENDIX B.  SQUAD SPEED CONVERSIONS 
This appendix contains the spreadsheet used to convert real-world speed into 
MANA agent speed. 
Real World kph Meters/30 sec Meters * 3600 time steps MANA kph
1 8.33 30000 30
2 16.67 60000 60
3 25.00 90000 90
4 33.33 120000 120
5 41.67 150000 150
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APPENDIX C.  WEAPONS FIRING RATE CONVERSIONS 
This appendix contains the spreadsheet used to calculate weapon firing rates in 
MANA simulation time. 








M16A2 5.56mm Rifles 550 1 12 6 0.20 6
M203 Grenade Launcher 350 5 7 3.5 0.12 3.5
M249 SAW 1000 1 85 42.5 1.42 42.5
60mm Mortars 3500 27.5 20 10 0.33 10
81 mm Mortars 5700 35 33 16.5 0.55 16.5
.50 Cal MG 1830 1 40 20 0.67 20
M240G MG 1800 1 100 50 1.67 50
MK 14 Mod 3 MG 1500 15 40 20 0.67 20
EFSS 120mm Mortars 8000 50 4 2 0.07 2
Hand grenade 40 15 6 3 0.10 3
AK47 400 1 10 5 0.17 5
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APPENDIX D.  MANA AGENT STATE TRACKER 
This appendix contains a spreadsheet useful for tracking the agent state 
parameters in MANA. 
State Allegiance Threat Class State Behavior Sense Shoot Fall back to
Default 1 3 3 Patrol to next waypoint 3 3
Fuel Out 1 3 1 Patrol back to base for resupply, shoot tank to count time in state
Shot At 1 3 1 Refuel supplies Default
En Contact 2 1 3 3 Engage Red, use supplies twice as fast 3 3 Default
Sqd Shot At (Sec) 1 3 3 Engage Red, use supplies three time as fast 3 3 Default
State Allegiance Threat Class State Behavior Sense Shoot Fall back to
Default 1 3 3 Provide security 3 3
Fuel Out 1 3 1 Resupply at tank, shoot tank to count time in state
Shot At 1 3 1 Refuel supplies Default
En Contact 2 1 3 3 Engage Red, use supplies twice as fast 3 3 Default
Sqd Shot At (Sec) 1 3 3 Engage Red, use supplies three time as fast 3 3 Default
State Allegiance Threat Class State Behavior Sense Shoot Fall back to
Default 1 3 3 Provide Fire Support 3 3
Fuel Out 1 3 1 Resupply at tank, shoot tank to count time in state
Shot At 1 3 1 Refuel supplies Default
En Contact 2 1 3 3 Engage Red, use supplies twice as fast 3 3 Default
Sqd Shot At (Sec) 1 3 3 Engage Red, use supplies three time as fast 3 3 Default
State Allegiance Threat Class State Behavior Sense Shoot Fall back to
Default 1 3 3 Provide Fire Support 3 3
Fuel Out 1 3 1 Resupply at tank, shoot tank to count time in state
Shot At 1 3 1 Refuel supplies Default
En Contact 2 1 3 3 Engage Red, use supplies twice as fast 3 3 Default
Sqd Shot At (Sec) 1 3 3 Engage Red, use supplies three time as fast 3 3 Default
State Allegiance Threat Class State Behavior Sense Shoot Fall back to
Default 2 1 1 Wait for Blue agents to need refuel 1 1
Ammo Out 2 1 4, 5, or 6 Wait to be resupplied by Aircraft
Shot at (Pri) 2 1 1 Resupply tank Default
State Allegiance Threat Class State Behavior Sense Shoot Fall back to
Default 1 3 1 Wait for supply tank to need refuel 4, 5, or 6
En Contact 1 1 3 1 Transition to Spare 1 4, 5, or 6 Spare 1
Spare 1 1 3 1 Flight time delay from seabase to tank Spare 2
Spare 2 1 3 1 Resupply (i.e. shoot) Tank 4, 5, or 6 2 Spare 3
Spare 3 1 3 1 Flight time delay from tank back to seabase Default
State Allegiance Threat Class State Behavior Sense Shoot Fall back to
Default 2 2 3 Move to next waypoint 3 3





Security Squad/Co HQ Squad
60mm Mortar Fire Team
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APPENDIX E.  PLANNING FACTOR DATA 
This appendix contains the planning factor data this research uses.  The 
Operations Analysis Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, 
Virginia provided this data to the author in November 2009. 
Data Sources for Planning Factors
CLASS 1, WATER (potable and non-potable by environment)
Source:Overarching Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study 2001 recommended 7.0 gallons /Marine/day
Number utilized was 7.0 gallons/Marine/day
CLASS 1, Rations (depends on mix and day)
Source:Overarching Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study 2001 recommended 5.25 lbs/Marine/day
This number modified to encompass weights of new MREs (1.86 lbs each instead of 1.75 lbs)
Number utilized was 5.58 lbs/Marine/day (3 MREs @ 1.86 lbs each)
CLASS 2, (Clothing, Individual Equipment) Need CARF!
Source:MAGTF Planner's Manual Feb 2009
No current CARF available!
Utilized SWA number of 2.091 lbs/Marine/day
Number will need to be increased to 4.038 if Chemical defense is to be included
CLASS 3, Fuel
Source:Overarching Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study 2001
Continued current methodology of computing comsumption by TAMCN by gallons per hour and varying hours of operation based on Assault/Sustained Rate.
CLASS 3, Lubricants
Source:Most sources do not include any factor for lubricants
Recommended further research
CLASS 4, (Construction) Need CARF!
Source:MAGTF Planner's Manual Feb 2009
Number utilized was 3.80 lbs/Marine/day 
CLASS 5, Ammunition
Source:MCO 8010.1E
Continue current methodology involving MCO 8010.1E (POM-10 Ammo PF) by DODIC
Utilized current methodology
CLASS 6, Personal Demand Items
Source:MAGTF Planner's Manual Feb 2009
Number utilized was MAGTF Planner's Manual 2009 "Arid" number of 3.4 lbs/Marine/day
CLASS 7, (Major End Items) Need CARF!
Source:Most sources have no factor for major end items.
Continued current methodology of not including a planning factor for this class of supply
CLASS 8, AMALs and ADALs
Source:MAGTF Planner's Manual 2009
Number utilized was MAGTF Planner's Manual SWA number of 1.47 lbs/Marine/day 
CLASS 9, Repair Parts
Source:List from SMU
Currently utilizing 2.5 lbs/Marine/day but recommened get a current list of "mount out" repair items from the Sassy Management Unit (SMU)
Utilizing 2.5 lbs/Marine/day until can get list from SMU
CLASS 2, Batteries (NEW!)
Source:Software Power Version 1.3, from SYSDCOM which they received from US Army CECOM LCMC, Power Sources Team, dtd 10/03/2008
Current methodology utilizes current T/E for MEB units.  Attempted to find each TAMCN from T/E in the Power Version 1.3 software 
Those in the software were identified by type and number of batteries utilized.  Then took the number of batteries, the hours of duration
for each type battery, and the weight of each battery to determine the total weight for batteries required in a day.
Finally, divided the total weight of batteries by the number of Marines in MEB to get requirement for batteries in lbs/Marine/day
Utilized 5.417 lbs/Marine/day as initial number for new methodology.  
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2 120 8000 90 1 11 3 4 70 
6 90 8000 90 1 7 2 2 0 
3 170 8000 60 1 3 4 4 70 
5 190 8000 90 1 12 0 3 0 
1 110 14000 60 1 8 2 5 70 
5 110 14000 30 1 5 3 1 0 
3 200 14000 60 1 4 1 5 70 
4 160 14000 30 1 14 5 1 0 
1 50 8000 60 1 15 4 3 70 
6 60 8000 60 1 2 1 3 0 
1 200 8000 60 1 2 4 2 70 
6 200 8000 90 1 15 3 5 0 
3 90 14000 60 1 11 0 2 70 
5 80 14000 90 1 4 5 3 0 
2 130 14000 60 1 4 0 1 70 
5 170 14000 30 1 8 5 4 0 
2 70 8000 150 1 11 4 3 0 
6 100 8000 150 1 3 0 3 70 
2 170 8000 120 1 1 4 3 0 
4 200 8000 150 1 12 2 1 70 
2 80 14000 180 1 10 1 5 0 
4 90 14000 180 1 2 5 2 70 
2 160 14000 180 1 6 0 5 0 
































2 80 8000 120 1 15 2 2 0 
6 50 8000 120 1 5 2 5 70 
2 160 8000 180 1 2 3 2 0 
6 200 8000 150 1 12 1 3 70 
2 120 14000 120 1 9 0 2 0 
4 120 14000 150 1 7 4 5 70 
3 160 14000 150 1 6 0 1 0 
4 150 14000 180 1 12 3 4 70 
1 100 8000 90 2 8 5 3 70 
6 120 8000 30 2 6 2 1 0 
3 190 8000 90 2 3 5 5 70 
4 180 8000 90 2 15 0 1 0 
1 100 14000 30 2 13 2 4 70 
6 70 14000 90 2 5 3 4 0 
2 200 14000 30 2 1 1 5 70 
6 180 14000 90 2 13 5 2 0 
2 120 8000 60 2 11 3 1 70 
5 110 8000 30 2 8 0 4 0 
3 150 8000 60 2 5 5 1 70 
4 180 8000 30 2 12 1 5 0 
2 50 14000 90 2 9 1 3 70 
6 110 14000 30 2 1 3 4 0 
1 170 14000 90 2 2 1 1 70 
































3 110 8000 180 2 15 5 5 0 
5 60 8000 120 2 7 0 2 70 
3 130 8000 150 2 3 5 3 0 
6 180 8000 180 2 9 2 2 70 
2 80 14000 120 2 13 0 4 0 
6 60 14000 120 2 2 3 2 70 
2 160 14000 150 2 1 1 4 0 
6 180 14000 150 2 10 3 2 70 
1 60 8000 150 2 10 5 1 0 
4 110 8000 180 2 3 1 5 70 
1 180 8000 180 2 6 3 1 0 
4 150 8000 180 2 14 2 4 70 
3 100 14000 120 2 14 2 1 70 
4 60 14000 120 2 6 4 4 70 
3 140 14000 180 2 7 1 2 0 
6 140 14000 180 2 9 4 3 70 
4 130 14000 120 2 8 3 3 70 
5 130 14000 120 2 5 2 2 0 
1 160 14000 120 2 9 3 4 70 
4 80 14000 150 2 13 1 2 0 
2 60 14000 120 2 4 5 3 70 
6 140 8000 150 2 8 3 1 0 
2 140 8000 180 2 11 2 5 70 
































3 90 8000 180 2 2 0 5 70 
6 200 14000 150 2 1 1 3 0 
1 190 14000 150 2 14 4 3 70 
6 50 14000 150 2 14 1 4 0 
1 50 14000 120 2 1 2 1 70 
4 160 8000 150 2 5 5 4 0 
2 170 8000 120 2 12 0 3 70 
5 120 8000 150 2 12 5 5 0 
2 90 8000 180 2 8 0 2 70 
5 180 14000 60 2 5 1 3 70 
1 150 14000 60 2 13 5 3 0 
5 80 14000 90 2 15 1 3 70 
3 50 14000 60 2 4 3 5 0 
5 170 8000 30 2 6 4 1 70 
3 160 8000 30 2 14 0 4 0 
5 90 8000 30 2 10 5 1 70 
2 110 8000 30 2 6 1 4 0 
5 170 14000 90 2 1 3 4 70 
1 200 14000 90 2 11 3 1 0 
5 90 14000 30 2 14 2 4 70 
1 60 14000 60 2 4 4 3 0 
5 130 8000 90 2 7 5 4 70 
3 130 8000 60 2 9 1 1 0 
































3 100 8000 30 2 4 2 2 0 
6 150 14000 120 1 8 0 3 0 
1 130 14000 180 1 10 3 5 70 
4 60 14000 120 1 13 0 1 0 
3 70 14000 120 1 1 5 5 70 
6 150 8000 180 1 3 3 2 0 
1 180 8000 120 1 11 2 2 70 
5 50 8000 180 1 15 4 1 0 
1 70 8000 120 1 3 0 4 70 
5 130 14000 150 1 5 2 5 0 
2 150 14000 180 1 8 5 2 70 
4 100 14000 150 1 11 0 5 0 
3 80 14000 180 1 4 4 1 70 
5 200 8000 120 1 7 4 3 0 
1 140 8000 180 1 15 2 2 70 
6 80 8000 120 1 14 4 5 0 
3 70 8000 150 1 4 1 1 70 
4 140 14000 30 1 1 0 1 70 
2 190 14000 90 1 9 5 4 0 
4 120 14000 60 1 13 0 3 70 
1 70 14000 30 1 7 3 4 0 
5 170 8000 90 1 3 5 2 70 
1 190 8000 90 1 14 2 4 0 































1 70 8000 60 1 6 2 4 0 
6 190 14000 60 1 6 0 5 70 
3 140 14000 30 1 13 4 1 0 
6 70 14000 30 1 10 2 5 70 
3 100 14000 30 1 2 3 2 0 
4 150 8000 90 1 2 3 5 0 
3 190 8000 90 1 10 1 2 0 
4 110 8000 30 1 9 4 4 70 
1 120 8000 30 1 7 1 3 0 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States Marine Corps uses maneuver 
warfare as a basic doctrinal concept to fight its battles.  
Maneuver warfare demands the ability to avoid the 
enemy’s strengths and attack his weaknesses in ways 
that are advantageous to the overall strategy.  This 
overarching concept has heavily influenced the 
development of the Marine Air Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF)—a size-scalable, combined-arms, multi-
mission-capable force used across the spectrum of 
conflict.  The Marine Corps is continually developing 
tactics, techniques, procedures, and technologies that 
seek to increase the efficiency and lethality of the 
MAGTF.  In this spirit, the Marine Corps Warfighting 
Laboratory (MCWL), whose “purpose is to improve 
current and future naval expeditionary warfare 
capabilities” (MCWL Website), is currently exploring 
the viability of a concept called Enhanced Company 
Operations (ECO).   
In August 2008, the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps, General James Conway, signed a white paper 
entitled, “A Concept for Enhanced Company 
Operations,” which states: 
Enhanced Company Operations describes an approach to 
the operational art that maximizes the tactical flexibility 
offered by true decentralized mission accomplishment, 
consistent with commander's intent and facilitated by 
improved command and control, intelligence, logistics, and 
fires capabilities.  Enhanced Company Operations will be 
reliant on increased access to, and organic control of, 
functional support, as well as excellence at the individual, 
squad, and platoon levels.  As such, it builds on the results 
of Distributed Operations experimentation and capability 
development to provide battalion commanders the critical 
link between operational planning and squad level tactical 
execution. 
ECO involves reorganizing and augmenting the 
traditional rifle company in a manner that contributes 
to “enhanced” C2, intelligence, logistics, and fires 
capabilities.  This process not only involves personnel 
changes, but also specific training and technological 
improvements.  The end state is to develop the 
company’s ability to become the base maneuver 
element of the MAGTF, a role traditionally held by the 
infantry battalion.  Changes include the incorporation 
of a company-level operations center, a company-level 
intelligence capability, enhanced fire support 
coordination, and personnel specifically tasked to 
focus on logistics.  
This team participated in an ongoing Naval 
Postgraduate School thesis project to explore the 
logistical impact of a deployed enhanced company on 
a Marine Expeditionary Unit’s (MEU) supporting 
assets.  At the start of the workshop, the team had the 
following goals: 
1. Asses and refine a simulation model 
developed using Map-Aware Non-uniform 
Automata (MANA) to evaluate the logistical 
impact of Marine Corps Enhanced Company 
Operations on a Marine Expeditionary Unit. 
2. Determine appropriate variables and ranges to 
incorporate into an experimental design. 
The MANA model referred to above is centered 
on a realistic Africa-based scenario that allows enemy 
agents to influence the logistical demand of the 
supported company.  
Description of Scenario 
This study uses a scenario developed by MCWL and 
used during the ECO Fires Conference of 21-23 April 
2009, which provides a realistic operational 
environment with which to test the ECO concept.  The   
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fictional scenario takes place on the African continent 
in the border area between Burundi and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.  In the notional 
orders describing the scenario, MCWL changed the 
names of the countries to prevent others from 
mistaking them for real-world events. 
The United States has a supportive relationship 
with the government of Bunduri, a relatively stable 
democracy in East Africa.  The U.S. has a neutral 
relationship with the government of Razie, which is 
led by a corrupt president who has used various 
nefarious means to stay in power for many years.  
Within Razie, there is a government opposition 
movement called the Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC).  In the latest elections, the leader of 
the MDC won the popular vote, but the sitting 
president refused to recognize the election results.  As 
a result of internal and international pressures, the two 
parties reached a power-sharing agreement with the 
president remaining in place and the winner of the 
elections serving as prime minister.   
After a failed assassination attempt on the prime 
minister, in which the president’s followers were 
implicated, the president dissolved the national 
government and instituted martial law.  The prime 
minister fled to the east of Razie with his MDC 
followers.  The MDC’s military arm, the Manicaland 
Peoples Force (MPF), rebelled and took control over 
Manica Province in Eastern Razie.  The former prime 
minister announced the formation of the independent 
state of Manicaland and declared war against Razie.  
Additionally, he declared Manica tribal lands within 
Bunduri as a part of Manicaland, and the MPF crossed 
into western Bunduri.  The contested area is shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Scenario Area of Operations 
The simulation attempts to model ECO-capable 
Alpha Company. MPF forces have been kicked out of 
Alpha Company’s area of operations (AO), but they 
continue to make incursions across the border to 
influence the local populace and to harass friendly 
forces.  Since Alpha Company is the main effort, they 
have the luxury of receiving the priority of support 
from the MEU’s assets. 
The MANA Model 
This team began the conference with an initial model 
representing Alpha company’s AO already built in 
MANA version 5.  A screen shot is shown in Figure 2. 
  Figure 2: Screen shot of initial MANA model 
The model background is a topographical map of 
the scenario area.  The red agents start on the Razie 
side of the boarder (denoted by the blue river) and will 
attempt to make it to the right most side of the play 
board.  Alpha Company has three established platoon 
positions within their AO.  At each position, two 
squads run patrols, and one squad remains for 
security.  There is also a 60mm mortar team at each 
platoon position.  As the model runs, the patrolling 
blue agents will interdict the red agents when they 
come into sensor and weapons ranges. 
WORKSHOP RESULTS 
The team spent the first day of the workshop 
familiarizing themselves with ECO, the scenario, and 
MANA.   
The team spent the second day attempting to 
incorporate the scenario logistical aspects into MANA. 
Our original idea was to have a supply “tank” at each 
platoon position that would hold two days of supply 
units for each blue agent at that position.  Each agent 
starts with one day of supply, and returns to the patrol 
base for a resupply when its tank is empty, so each  
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agent has a total of three days of supply available 
at the start of the scenario.  When the patrol base tank 
is depleted, a resupply agent, the MEU helicopter, flies 
to the tank and replenishes the supply units.  We 
attempted to model this behavior using MANA’s fuel 
parameter and auto-refueller agents.  
 The team had trouble implementing this scenario 
into MANA.  Our initial attempt had the agents 
transition from their default state to a “fuel out” state 
when their resources were depleted, and then to a 
“refuel by friend” state when they come into contact 
with the resupply tank.  Unfortunately, this did not 
give the desired behavior because as each squad 
entered the “fuel out” state, some of the agents would 
immediately transition into the “refuel by friend” state 
due to their close proximity to other friendly agents in 
the squad.  This resulted in some agents transferring 
back to their default state without receiving any fuel, 
which then continued to decrement their fuel 
parameter below zero, causing the agent to never enter 
the “fuel out” state again.  Many different 
combinations of triggers and trigger states were 
attempted in order to get this refueling scenario to 
work, but despite the large amount of experience with 
MANA no combination of triggers and trigger states 
produced the desired result.  The team also had 
trouble with MANA’s seemingly random handling of 
agents.  For example, MANA would sometimes allow 
two agents to refuel from the tank during the same 
time step, but it would only deplete the tank one 
agent’s allocation of supply units.  By the end of the 
second day, we had decided to try another method. 
The team spent day three creatively using MANA 
to create the desired logistical behavior.  This time, 
instead of using MANA’s refueling states, we relied on 
the different sensor and weapon parameters to trigger 
when an agent could refuel itself by using a negative 
fuel consumption rate.  For instance, an agent starts 
patrolling with one day of supply units.  Once those 
units are depleted, that agent changes to a state that is 
visible to the resupply tank’s sensor and returns to the 
base.  When the agent returns to the base, and comes 
within the resupply tank’s weapon’s range, it is shot 
by the tank.  The agent switches into the “shot at” 
state, refuels itself, and then continues on its mission.  
When the tank has fired all of its ammunition, which is 
used to represent the tank’s supply capacity, it 
changes states into one visible by the resupply agent 
(the MEU helicopter), is shot at by the resupply agent, 
and reverts back into the default state with a full load 
of ammunition (i.e. supplies).   
While this algorithm worked in a simplified 
model, apparently random behavior in MANA 
stopped it from working in the more complicated 
scenario.  Similar to our initial attempt, we 
experienced problems with the agent’s transition 
between states.  MANA appeared to have a problem 
with the state duration which, from time to time, 
would adjust itself by a single time step.  One of the 
effects of this was that the agent spent too much or too 
little time in the “shot at” state and was not refueled 
accurately; agents often received too much or too little 
fuel.  In another instance, the resupply tank would 
shoot the blue agents even though it was out of 
ammunition.  Our conclusion was that unresolved 
issues and model limitations in the current release of 
MANA 5 made this model unsuitable for this 
particular study.  
Although this team spent over 64 man hours trying to 
get MANA to work, all is not lost.  After the 
conference, Capt Hinkson contacted one of the MANA 
developers, Mark Anderson, who explained that 
MANA uses a random draw to determine which agent 
gets to have its turn first.  MANA also did not 
implement trigger state changes in the same time step 
in which they occurred.  This explained MANA’s 
apparently erratic behavior.  Mr. Anderson provided 
Capt Hinkson with an updated version of MANA 5 
that included instantaneous state changes.  The model 
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